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Abstract 
 
 
Our analysis, based on a variety of standard econometric techniques, aims to be 
a fairly comprehensive test of the hypotheses about long cycles, associated with 
the name of Kondratiev/Kondratieff. Our work tries to link the issue of long 
cycles with the issue of economic convergence and divergence in the world 
system, because there are very strong cyclical ups and downs of relative 
convergence in the world system, observable not just in the “national” growth 
rates and “national” economic cycles. Already the Japanese economist Kaname 
Akamatsu, who lived from August 7, 1896 to December 20, 1974, and who was 
a great admirer of Kondratiev/Kondratieff, hinted at this connection. His most 
well-known tribute to Kondratiev/Kondratieff (Akamatsu, 1961) specifically 
links the rise and decline of the global peripheries to the larger 
Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycle. His contribution, which is hardly ever mentioned 
nowadays in the framework of K-cycle research, is the starting point of our 
analysis.  
 
In fact, these “Akamatsu cycles”, analyzed in this work, are even stronger and 
seem to be more devastating than the “national Kondratiev/Kondratieff waves” 
and world systemic waves themselves, leading to the discovery of what might be 
even termed a “double-Tsunami wave structure”. 
 
Both our re-analysis of world industrial production growth data since 1741 as 
well as the global conflict data since 1495, presented in this article, cautiously 
support the earlier contentions of world system research with evidence, tested by 
spectral analysis and auto-correlation analysis.  
 
Using the well-known and now updated Maddison data base at 
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/data.htm, 
Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycles of around 60 years duration at a nation state level 
are most clearly visible in Argentina, Canada, and Russia, with evidence on the 
existence of longer cycles of more than 35 years also in Belgium; Chile; Greece; 
Netherlands; India; New Zealand; Spain; and USA; while for the other countries 
of the Maddison data set, earlier negative spectral density analysis results 
reported in the ample literature surveyed in this article could not be falsified. By 
contrast, the evidence about strong long term cycles of convergence seems to be 
very convincing. 
 
Future research is recommended to realize that convergence processes in most 
nations of the world are discontinuous and of a cyclical nature, thus supporting 
the pessimism inherent in the writings by the world systems scholar Giovanni 
Arrighi on the subject.  
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The recurrence of major world economic downturns and depressions, such as the 
one which began in 1929 and 2007, are linked forever with the name of the 
Russian economist Nikolai Dmitriyevich Kondratiev/Kondratieff
2           
                           March 1892 – 17 September 1938). If the crash of 
2007/2008 is but a continuation of earlier economic major downturns in the 
1970s, the 1930s, the 1890s and 1850s, then the prospects for the semi-
peripheries in Europe’s South and in Ireland, recently referred to in the 
economics profession as the “PIIGS countries”  Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, 
Spain, see, for differing perspectives on this issue, Baglioni and Cherubini, 
2010; De Grauwe and Ji, 2012; Erber, 2013; Hadjimichalis, 2011; Noren, 2011; 
Richardson, 2011; Wind, 2011) are even grimmer. And if we manage to show 
convincingly that these countries, in addition to suffering a “national” long-term 
downswing, are also caught in the long-term downturn of their once so 
successful convergence and catching-up process with the capitalist centers, then 
we realize how much of an economic and social tsunami we are now 
confronting in the European South. 
 
 
Preamble 
 
 
The background to this study is thus the current severe recession on the 
European continent and in several other regions of the world economy since the 
crisis, which began in 2007. Is it a world system coincidence or does it 
correspond to a world systemic regularity that parts of the global periphery crash 
at regular intervals? What does our social scientific knowledge tell us about the 
regularity of such crises, and what conclusions can one draw for the center-
periphery relationship on a global scale and also for the probable future 
continued decline of these regions in Europe? 
 
The aim of this article, which tries to summarize recent massive evidence
3
 on 
the issue of long cycles, is to re-assess the entire question of 
Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycles within this larger center-periphery frame of 
reference. To facilitate future Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycle research, we have 
made hundreds of interpretations of our data series, i.e. time series plots, spectral 
periodograms and spectral density graphs, rolling correlations and regressions 
freely available on the Internet at 
                                                 
2
 Google scholar at http://scholar.google.at/schhp?hl=de lists 13800 entries with the spelling „Kondratieff“ and 
13400 with the spelling „Kondratiev“. For this reason we have chosen to use, wherever possible, both versions. 
3
 All the evidence and sources are available from http://uibk.academia.edu/ArnoTausch/Documentation-for-
articles  
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http://uibk.academia.edu/ArnoTausch/Documentation-for-articles together with 
some important EXCEL file sheets. 
 
Our analysis thus aims to be a fairly comprehensive test of the hypotheses about 
long cycles, associated with the name of Kondratiev/Kondratieff and Kuznets 
(Devezas, 2006; Solomou, 2013a, 2013b). Our work aims to link the issue of 
long cycles with the issue of economic convergence and divergence, because the 
startling discovery which one makes upon closer inspection of the trajectories of 
economic convergence in the 31 countries with the newly available Maddison 
data set since the 19
th
 Century (Bolt and van Zanden, 2013) is that there are very 
strong cyclical ups and downs of the relative convergence of these countries in 
relationship to the real GDP per capita at the world level and in the capitalist 
system’s leading economies, such as the United Kingdom and the United States 
of America, and not just in their own “national” growth rates and national 
economic cycles.  
 
Kondratiev/Kondratieff was Russian, and a look at the relative position of his 
home country, measured by Russian/USSR constant GDP per capita in real 
purchasing power parity as a percentage of global average constant GDP per 
capita in real purchasing power parity just shows how dramatic these long-term 
“Tsunami waves” of global convergence/divergence with a duration of up to 70 
or 90 years can be. Thus Russia fell two times within the time-span of 100 years 
from the comfortable position of the world’s income middle class to the level of 
the world’s lower class: 
 
Graph 1: Former USSR/Russian constant GDP per capita in real 
purchasing power parity as a % of global average constant GDP per in real 
purchasing power parity. Time series from 1885 to 2010 
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Legend: our own compilations, based on the Maddison data sets, as documented in Bolt and 
van Zanden, 2013. Calculated from the original data with Microsoft EXCEL 2010. The time 
series of real GDP per capita is expressed in constant 1990 $ for the following countries since 
1885 (1942-1948 were omitted): Argentina; Australia; Austria; Belgium; Brazil; Canada; 
Chile; Colombia; Denmark; England/GB/UK; Former USSR/Russia; Finland; France; 
Germany; Greece; Holland/Netherlands; India; Indonesia (Java before 1880); Italy; Japan; 
New Zealand; Norway; Peru; Portugal; Spain; Sri Lanka; Sweden; Switzerland; Uruguay; 
USA; Venezuela. Source: http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm  
 
An unexpected Kondratiev/Kondratieff revival might be happening again, this 
time perhaps via the important link between the theory of global income 
convergence, best captured by the works of the late Italian American world 
system researcher Giovanni Arrighi and the already mentioned Japanese 
economist Kaname Akamatsu. Since Akamatsu’ s contributions appeared much 
earlier than Arrighi’s, let us first mention here Akamatsu, and we will deal later 
on with Arrighi’s contribution. In Akamatsu’s theory, there are important links 
between his “flying geese” (Gankō Keitairon) model and 
Kondratiev/Kondratieff’s ideas. This “flying geese” model was first proposed in 
a far-reaching and long tribute to Kondratiev/Kondratieff’s theory published 
internationally in 1961. The most well-known tribute to Kondratiev/Kondratieff 
by Akamatsu, i.e. Akamatsu, 1961 (which was originally published in Japan 
already in 1937) specifically links the rise and decline of the global peripheries 
to the larger Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycle. The very essence of the “flying 
geese” and the K-cycle is that the two processes are intractably linked together, 
and that one cannot separate the one from the other.  
 
Recent contributions in international social science have begun to approach 
these issues of the evolution of international convergence on the basis of the 
Maddison data since the 1870s, without, however, mentioning Akamatsu’ s 
economic framework, and without employing econometric time series analysis 
techniques (Rasler and Thompson, 2009; Reuveny and Thompson, 2008). 
Giovanni Arrighi also seems to have been very conscious about this problem as 
well, which is now hitting with the devastating force of a social Tsunami his 
country of birth, Italy, and his world system theory clearly distinguished 
between the centers, the semi-peripheries and the peripheries, and highlights the 
fact that some semi-peripheries rise while others stumble on their development 
paths (Arrighi, 1995; Arrighi, Silver and Brewer, 2003). So nothing about the 
idea of linear progress and convergence, so popular in neoclassical economics. 
 
Some time ago, we could read in the New York Times: 
 
“The jobless rate among Europeans aged 15 through 24 in the euro area was 24 
percent in March [2013], according to official figures, up from 22.5 percent a 
year earlier. In Greece, 59 percent of young people are unemployed, while in 
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Spain 56 percent of youths are without work. Portugal and Italy also have 
extremely high youth unemployment rates, in both cases above 38 percent, 
according to Eurostat, the E.U. statistics agency.” (The New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/14/business/global/14iht-
youthjobs14.html?_r=0 
 
 Currently (i.e. June 2013), almost 27 million men and women in the EU-
27 were unemployed.
4
 Among the EU-Member States, the lowest 
unemployment rates were recorded in Austria (4.9 %), Germany (5.4 %) 
and Luxembourg (5.6 %), and the highest rates in Greece (27.0 %), Spain 
(26.8 %) and Portugal (17.8 %). 
 
 The unemployed could claim a good share in the present decision-making 
body of the European Union, the Council, because their numbers are now 
so high that they already surpass the absolute population size of all the 
other EU-27 countries except “the big six” i.e. Germany  United 
Kingdom; France; Italy; Spain; Poland.  
 
 What is even more alarming is that in spring of 2013 there were 5.627 
million young persons (under 25) who were unemployed, of whom 3.624 
million were in the euro area. The highest rates were recorded in Greece 
(62.5 %), Spain (56.4 %), Portugal (42.5 %) and Italy (40.5 %). 
 
One of the reasons, why a thorough re-analysis of the entire issue of long cycles 
is necessary is the fact that classifying the cyclical ups and downs in the global 
economy since the mid-18
th
 Century, leads even among the authors of the recent 
first Kondratieff Waves Almanac (Grinin, Devezas and Korotayev, 2012) to 
differing dates of the global economic troughs and sometimes also leads them to 
predict differing dates for the Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycle crashes to come: 
 
 
Berry and Dean, 2012:
5
 1843; 1899; 1955; 2010. 
Helenius, 2012: 1787; 1842-1843; 1892; 1948; ? 
Korotayev and Grinin, 2012: 1780-1790; 1844-1851; 1890-1896; 1939-1950; 
1984-1991; 2015-2020. 
Modelski, 2012: 1792; 1850; 1914; 1973; 2030. 
Perez, 2012: Recessive interval (turning points): 1771, 1829, 1875, 1908, 1971; 
Recession turning points: 1793-1797; 1845-1850; 1890-1895; 1929-1933; 2007. 
Thompson, 2012: Start-up phases: 1740-1763; 1792-1815; 1850-1873; 1914-
1945; 1973-2000; 2030-2050; Schumpeterian troughs: 1827, 1883, 1937, 1990 
 
                                                 
4
 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/  
5
 Rounded values from Figure 4, page 116. Please note that Berry and Dean, 2012, in Figure 2, page 109 talk 
about prices.  
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At a time of radical shifts in the market shares of major countries in the world 
economy and the often dramatic ascent of the BRICs countries and the 
concomitant – equally dramatic - decline of the West, especially Western 
Europe, and the very deep crisis in the European South, no other perspective on 
Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycles could be more up to date than the relationship 
between the K-cycle and the process of convergence and divergence in the 
world system (Gosh, Havlik, Ribero and Urban, W. 2009; Havlik, Pindyuk and 
Stoellinger, 2009).  
 
The title of this article, its style and its way of presentation are meant as a 
concrete tribute to medicine, and here to the path-breaking article on cancer 
research by Hanahan and Weinberg, 2000, which received more than 10.000 
quotations in world scientific literature, as documented by the Thomson Reuters 
Web of Knowledge since its publication more than a decade ago.  
 
The spirit of the day in Europe is not as equally monolithic as the one existing in 
Russia in the 1930s, but also this time it is being maintained very uniformly that 
there is no alternative for the European periphery but to continue to be members 
of the Eurozone and to be subjected to the phlebotomy (bloodletting) of austerity 
packages under the auspices of the European Commission, while in reality the 
discovery of the organizing principles for rationalizing the complexities of the 
disease of stagnation and recession are being called for (in accordance with 
Hanahan and Weinberg, 2000, 2011).  
 
 
Background  
 
 
In the single long-wave study that did appear in the flagship journal of the 
Wallersteinean world systems approach, the Journal of World Systems 
Research, Li, Xiao and Zhu, 2007, which is based on a global aggregate data 
analysis about movements of the Marxist concept of the rate of profit in the 
world economy, the authors came to the conclusion that between the mid-19
th
 
Century and 2005, in the UK and in the United States there were four long 
waves, and in Japan, since 1905, there were three such waves. The Euro-zone 
profit rate has, according to Li, Xiao and Zhu, 2007 tended to fall over the past 
four decades since 1963, and nearly halved between the early 1960s and the 
early 2000s. That would suggest a profit-rate related cycle of around 30-40 
years duration.  
 
Starting with the usual IMF World Economic Outlook data (as of October 
2012), we immediately see that the share of the Western “triade” in global 
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purchasing power has been reduced dramatically. Even in their wildest anti-
Western dreams, opponents of the West would not have been able to imagine 
what has come true today – the tremendous reduction of Western economic 
power within only three decades: 
 
 
Graph 2: the observed and projected decline of the share of the United 
States, the European Union and Japan in global purchasing power, 1980-
2016 
 
 
 
Legend: our own calculations, based on IMF World Economic Outlook database, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/weodata/index.aspx . Microsoft EXCEL 
2010 Graphs and Statistical Analyses. 
 
 
As Table 1 shows to us, the strong decline of real incomes in many countries in 
the periods 1929-1933 and 2007-2011 has not been universal, and the data rather 
suggest that crises are also times of major shifts in the relative position of 
countries in the global economy. Table 1 underlines how dramatically different 
the experience of the European periphery is in comparison to the ascending 
BRIC countries. An no one can say that social sciences did not voice warnings 
about these tendencies already three decades ago, as the very necessary re-
reading of Seers, Schaffer and Kiljunen, 1979 and Seers, Vaitsos and Kiljunen, 
1980, 1982 will clearly suggest: 
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Table 1:  comparing the real GDP per capita declines in the two crashes, 
1929-1933 and 2007-2011 in the countries of the world system with 
complete data 
 
 
 Crash 1929-
1933 in % 
Crash 2007-
2011 in % 
Trend value 
linear 
regression 
crash 1929-
>crash2007 
Residual (= how 
well a country 
survived the 
2007 crisis 
judged by the 
crash in 1929) 
China 3,02 41,60 3,23 38,37 
India -3,85 25,27 3,88 21,39 
Uruguay -28,52 24,67 6,20 18,46 
Sri Lanka -13,92 23,17 4,83 18,34 
Peru -18,34 23,25 5,24 18,00 
Indonesia -13,71 20,29 4,81 15,49 
Ecuador -3,03 13,47 3,80 9,68 
Poland -24,89 14,59 5,86 8,72 
South Korea 11,54 10,39 2,42 7,97 
Brazil -5,36 11,76 4,02 7,74 
Colombia 4,78 9,58 3,06 6,52 
Philippines -3,18 10,12 3,81 6,31 
Turkey 10,63 7,85 2,51 5,34 
Chile -35,28 11,11 6,84 4,26 
Malaysia -14,39 8,97 4,87 4,10 
Bulgaria 6,19 6,82 2,93 3,89 
Singapore -13,88 7,31 4,82 2,48 
Russian 
Federation/USSR 
7,72 4,98 2,78 2,20 
Costa Rica 4,93 4,48 3,05 1,44 
Serbia - 
Yugoslavia 
-15,92 4,89 5,02 -0,12 
South Africa -4,94 3,27 3,98 -0,71 
Romania 2,78 2,37 3,25 -0,88 
Nicaragua -16,80 4,15 5,10 -0,95 
Australia -8,00 3,27 4,27 -1,00 
Germany -12,22 3,50 4,67 -1,16 
Sweden -0,74 1,16 3,58 -2,43 
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Switzerland -6,70 0,41 4,15 -3,74 
Czech Republic - 
Czechoslovakia 
-16,11 1,22 5,03 -3,81 
Honduras -15,81 0,29 5,01 -4,71 
Austria -23,41 0,79 5,72 -4,93 
Guatemala -21,05 0,46 5,50 -5,04 
Belgium -7,38 -1,32 4,21 -5,53 
Portugal 7,58 -2,73 2,80 -5,53 
Mexico -14,57 -0,71 4,89 -5,60 
El Salvador -11,43 -1,15 4,59 -5,74 
Netherlands -12,88 -1,22 4,73 -5,95 
Japan 4,74 -3,08 3,06 -6,15 
Hungary -4,12 -2,36 3,90 -6,26 
France -10,00 -2,12 4,46 -6,58 
Venezuela -17,37 -1,83 5,15 -6,98 
Norway 4,34 -4,48 3,10 -7,58 
Canada -33,46 -1,14 6,67 -7,81 
Finland -0,55 -4,42 3,56 -7,99 
Denmark 4,26 -5,76 3,11 -8,87 
United States -30,76 -2,63 6,42 -9,05 
United Kingdom -4,11 -5,19 3,90 -9,09 
New Zealand -13,04 -4,85 4,74 -9,59 
Spain -9,24 -5,52 4,38 -9,90 
Italy -7,67 -6,60 4,24 -10,84 
Ireland -0,85 -13,85 3,59 -17,44 
Greece 2,26 -15,46 3,30 -18,76 
 
 
Note: Countries marked in blue color dived through the depths of the 2008 crisis better than 
had to be expected from the depth of the recession they experienced in the 1930s. Countries 
marked in yellow color are below this regression line. 
 
2007-2011: GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $). GDP per capita based on 
purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP GDP is gross domestic product converted to international 
dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing 
power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States. GDP at purchaser's prices is the 
sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and 
minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making 
deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural 
resources. Data are in constant 2005 international dollars. 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD  
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1929-1933: GDP per capita; (1990 Int. GK$). http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-
project/home.htm  
 
 
Equally astonishing is the contemporary rise of the importance of the two 
BRICS countries, China and India, in the international system evidenced by 
their share in the world purchasing power today: 
 
 
Graph 3: the observed and projected decline of China, India, Russia, Brazil 
and South Africa in global purchasing power, 1980-2016 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend: our own calculations, based on IMF World Economic Outlook database, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/weodata/index.aspx .Microsoft EXCEL 
2010 Graphs and Statistical Analyses. 
 
Also, equally breathtaking is the decline of the Euro-area, which in the 1990s 
and early 2000s still hoped to become the world’s leading economy by around 
2010: 
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Graph 4: Eurozone – decline: share of the world purchasing power since 
1991 
 
 
 
Legend: our own calculations, based on IMF World Economic Outlook database, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/weodata/index.aspx .Microsoft EXCEL 
2010 Graphs and Statistical Analyses. 
 
Today, not economic ascent, but rising unemployment is the hallmark of the 
Eurozone: 
 
Graph 5: Eurozone – decline: unemployment rates since 1991 
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Legend: our own calculations, based on IMF World Economic Outlook database, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/weodata/index.aspx .Microsoft EXCEL 
2010 Graphs and Statistical Analyses. 
 
 
There is now some new light in international research on the hotly contested 
issue of economic convergence, so well-known from neo-classical contemporary 
economics (Barro and Ursúa, 2008; Jaeger and Springler, 2012; and Mankiw, 
Romer and Weil, 1992). In their truly remarkable article on all economic crashes 
and downturns since the mid-19
th
 Century, based on their own version of an 
earlier edition of the Maddison data set, the neo-classical economists Barro and 
Ursúa, 2008 open the way for a new long-term, structural research approach to 
the question of K-cycles in the international system. According to the “iron law 
of convergence,” mentioned by Barro, inter alia, in Barro, 2012, countries 
eliminate gaps in levels of real per capita GDP at a rate around 2% per year. 
Convergence at a 2% rate implies that it takes 35 years for half of an initial gap 
to vanish and 115 years for 90% to disappear. But as we will show in our article, 
this assumption is absolutely unrealistic, since the countries of the world 
experience – more often than not – dramatic implosions of their once so 
successful development path, as shown in Graph 6. In this sense, a good part of 
the experience of the countries of the world rather looks like the Russian 
experience of Graph 1, and not these optimistic assumptions of neoclassical 
economics. 
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Graph 6: The countries which experienced the strongest fluctuations in 
their convergence/divergence history as measured by a UNDP type yearly 
index of purchasing power 
 
 
 
UNDP type index of purchasing power (purchasing power of the country minus lowest 
purchasing power in the year/(highest purchasing power minus lowest purchasing power in 
the year) 
 
 
 
Without mentioning the legacy of Kondratiev/Kondratieff, Barro and Ursúa, 
2008 reach the conclusion that for their country samples starting at 1870, a peak-
to-trough method to isolate economic crises, defined as cumulative declines in 
consumption or GDP of at least 10 percent, yielded 95 crises for consumption 
and 152 for GDP in the world system, implying disaster probabilities of 3 
percent a year, with a mean size of 21-22 percent declines and average cycle 
durations of 32 years. This entirely mainstream, neoclassical approach thus 
opens up the way for a new approach to the whole question of 
Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycles. 
 
Latest advances in mainstream economic theory in the traditions of research, 
initiated by Barro and associates, like Gourio, 2012, also seem to be well aware 
of the kind of causal processes, which for a long time have been at the center of 
the debates about K-cycles, although also Gourio, 2012 does not even mention 
the name of Kondratiev/Kondratieff. For Gourio, 2012, a disaster is a 
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combination of permanent and transitory shocks to productivity, and a 
depreciation shock to capital, and shows that this simple approach allows 
replicating accurately the response of consumption to a disaster. An increase in 
the disaster probability affects the economy by lowering expectations, and by 
increasing risk. Because investors are risk averse, this higher risk leads, 
according to Gourio, 2012, to higher risk premia, and has significant 
implications both for business cycles and for asset prices: stock prices fall, 
employment and output contract, and investment especially declines.  
 
The notable trend in the reception of Kondratiev/Kondratieff’s works by 
Akamatsu is that he puts the “differentiation” of the world economy into the 
center of his theoretical developments (Akamatsu, 1961). The differentiation of 
the world economy leads to the rapid diffusion of new techniques to rising 
industrial nations, which starts with the import of new commodities by these 
nations. In time, techniques and capital goods are imported as well, and 
homogenous industries are being established. The uniformization of both 
industry and agriculture gave rise to the fierce and conflictive competition 
between Europe, the United States and Japan in the last quarter of the 19
th
 
Century. When an innovation occurs in some industry in an advanced nation, 
investment is concentrated there, causing a rise in the trade cycle. Innovation 
leads to an increase in exports, and the nation’s prosperity creates and increases 
the import of raw materials and foodstuffs. Akamatsu sees a counter-movement 
in other parts of the world, centered on the rising production of gold, which, 
according to him, leads to an increase in effective demand and further stimulates 
exports of the innovating nation. In that way, world production and trade 
expand, prices increase and a world-wide rise in the long-term trade cycle 
results. 
 
However, innovations spread from the innovating nations to other nations, 
leading to the development of industries in those countries, with the result of a 
conflictive relationship with the industries of the innovating nation. Exports of 
the innovating nation become stagnant, and on the world level, there is a 
tendency towards overproduction, prices turn downwards, and the rates of 
growth of production and trade fall. That what later K-cycle research tended to 
call the first, rising A-phase of the cycle will be according to Akamatsu a period 
of differentiation in the world economic structure, while the “falling period”  or 
B-phase of the cycle) will, Akamatsu argues, coincide with a process of 
uniformization in world economic structure. Graph 7 supports the contention by 
Akamatsu that the A-phases of long upswings in the world economy widen 
international inequalities, while the B-phases of long decline reduce constant 
real international GDP per capita purchasing power differences: 
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Graph 7: the coefficient of variation of constant real world GDP per capita 
incomes in purchasing power parity rate according to the Maddison data 
base (31 countries) 
 
 
 
Legend: our own compilations, based on the Maddison data sets, as documented in Bolt and 
van Zanden, 2013. Calculated from the original data with Microsoft EXCEL 2010 
 
 
In the 19
th
 Century, Akamatsu sees the following major tendencies at work: 
 
 The innovations of the first wave of the Industrial Revolution and the 
respective differentiation in the world economy 
 
 The B-phase after the Napoleonic Wars brought about a re-uniformization 
 
 
 Uniformization especially of European agriculture, innovation in iron 
industry after 1850  England’s position as a prime exporter of railroad 
materials and textiles. The discovery of gold in California and Australia 
increases global demand 
 
 The beginning of the decline around the time of the Franco-Prussian War 
1870, rising mercantilism and imperialism 
 
 
The third wave started its stagnation phase in the 1920’s and ended with the 
Great Depression.  
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For Akamatsu, the characteristic structure of the Center-Periphery relationship is 
characterized by the fact that the underdeveloped nation will export primary 
products and will import industrial goods for consumption. Later on, an 
underdeveloped nation will attempt to produce goods which were hitherto 
imported, first in the field of consumer goods, and later on in the area of capital 
goods. As the fourth stage of the process, the underdeveloped nation will 
attempt to export capital goods. There will be a tendency of “advanced” 
differentiation in the world economy, however, because the capital goods 
industries in advanced nations will still advance further, giving rise to “extreme 
differences of comparative costs”. The wild-geese flying pattern will include 
three sub-patterns: the first is the sequence of imports – domestic production – 
exports. The second will be the sequence from consumer goods to capital goods 
and from crude and simple articles to complex and refined articles. The third 
will be the alignment from the advanced nations to backward nations according 
to their stages of growth. 
 
However, there is a darker and more somber nature of these cycles as well – the 
condition of discrepancy will be met, Akamatsu argues, by means of imports, 
leading to discrepancies in the balance of payments, and the pressure to increase 
exports of primary products to improve the balance. Discrepancies will also lead 
to a shift of production away from domestic industries in the underdeveloped 
country towards the export sector; leading, in the end, also to problems of 
excessive supply capacities in the underdeveloped country etc.  
 
At the end of the day, Akamatsu believes in a Hegelian dialectic between the 
three basic discrepancies, characterizing the process of development: the 
discrepancy of development, the cyclical discrepancy between the rich and the 
poor countries, and the structural discrepancy. At this stage however, Akamatsu 
does not formalize his arguments any further.  
 
Arrighi, Silver and Brewer (2003) further developed these arguments, put 
forward by Akamatsu, and consciously link their theoretical advances also with 
the models implied in the works of Raymond Vernon (1966, 1971), which 
specifies the life cycle of a product as defined by introduction, growth, maturity, 
saturation, and decline. Profit-oriented innovations (and their impact on 
competitive pressures) cluster in time, generating swings in the economy as a 
whole from long phases of predominating "prosperity" to long phases of 
predominating "depression." Arrighi already foresaw that they not only cluster 
in time, but that they also cluster in space. There will be a spatial polarization of 
zones of predominating "prosperity" and zones of predominating "depression". 
Arrighi draws a specific parallel with Schumpeter's theory of innovations, 
Akamatsu’ s "flying geese" model (1961), and Raymond Vernon's "product-
cycle" model (1966). For Arrighi, Silver and Brewer (2003), both models 
portray the diffusion of industrial innovations as a spatially structured process 
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originating in the more "developed" (that is, wealthier) countries and gradually 
involving poorer, less "developed" countries. But, according to Arrighi, Silver 
and Brewer (2003), the innovation process will be highly unequal, for it tends to 
begin in the wealthier countries. The residents of the countries where the 
innovation process starts have the best chances to win from this. According to 
Arrighi, Silver and Brewer (2003), the process tends to begin in the 
wealthier countries because high incomes create a favorable environment 
for product innovations; high costs create a favorable environment for 
innovations in techniques; and cheap and abundant credit creates a 
favorable environment for financing these and all other kinds of 
innovations. Moreover, as innovators in wealthy countries reap abnormally 
high rewards relative to effort, over time the environment for innovations 
in these countries improves further, thereby generating a self-reinforcing 
"virtuous circle" of high incomes and innovations. The obverse side of this 
virtuous circle is a second tendency--the tendency, that is, for the poorer 
countries at the receiving end of the process to reap few, if any, of the 
benefits of the innovations. For Arrighi, Silver and Brewer (2003), by the time 
the "new" products and techniques are adopted by the poorer countries, they 
tend to be subject to intense competition and no longer bring the high returns 
they did in the wealthier countries. Equally, there is for Arrighi, Silver and 
Brewer (2003) the destructive aspect of innovations in the tradition of 
Schumpeter at work. For Arrighi, Silver and Brewer (2003), poor countries are 
not necessarily more exposed than wealthy countries to the destructiveness of 
major innovations. Nevertheless, the greater mass and variety of resources that 
wealthy countries command nationally and globally will endow their residents 
with a far greater capacity to adjust socially and economically to the disruptive 
strains and to move promptly from the activities that innovations make less 
rewarding to those they make more rewarding. As a result, even when they do 
not initiate the innovations, wealthy countries tend to be in an incomparably 
better position than poor and middle-income countries to reap their benefits and 
shift their costs and disruptions onto others. In short, opportunities for economic 
advance, as they present themselves successively to one country after another, 
do not constitute equivalent opportunities for all countries.”  Arrighi, Silver and 
Brewer, 2003) 
 
 
Methodology and data 
 
 
So, our empirical analysis of long cycles will be carried out in the necessary 
larger framework of center-periphery relationships, and in the framework of 
ascent and decline in the world economy. We will, as we already stated briefly, 
look anew into the existence of these larger cycles of the world economy and in 
the economic history of relative ascent or decline of the 31 center nations and 
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periphery nations, for which we now have available yearly real GDP per capita 
estimates from the middle of the 19
th
 Century onwards until today. Our data for 
the 31 countries under scrutiny here are exclusively based, as we already briefly 
mentioned, on Angus Maddison’s research  see Bolt and van Zanden, 2013, and 
Maddison, 2003, 2007. The considerable opportunities offered by Microsoft 
EXCEL 2010 for calculating long rows of percentage changes, relative ascent 
and decline, and rolling regressions and correlations over long distances of time 
were extensively used in our research endeavor (Perman and Tavera, 2005; 
Smith and Taylor, 2001; Tang, 2010).  
 
Our data for world industrial production growth are an extension of the ample 
materials, first presented by Goldstein, 1988, updated by Tausch and Ghymers, 
2007, relying on UNIDO data on world-wide industrial production growth from 
the mid-1970s to the turn of the millennium, now updated by open access 
figures from the United States Central Intelligence Agency. Our figures on 
major power wars were first presented by Goldstein, 1988, updated by PRIO 
data (major power wars) until 2002 (Tausch and Ghymers, 2007). Our data for 
the 31 countries under scrutiny here are exclusively based on Angus Maddison’s 
widely received research; see Bolt and van Zanden, 2013, and Maddison, 2003, 
2007. These countries currently make up approximately 40.8% of global 
population and 57.8% of global purchasing power. Appendix 1 and 2 further 
highlight our freely available data. At the website 
http://uibk.academia.edu/ArnoTausch/Documentation-for-articles readers can 
download the most important data and also hundreds of spectral density graphs, 
rolling correlations and regressions, autocorrelation analyses at the level of the 
world system and at the level of the 31 analyzed countries. 
 
In the social sciences, there was already a very vast and divergent, often 
contradictory debate about Kondratiev/Kondratieff’s ideas  Kondratieff, 1925, 
1926, 1928, 1935). Bornschier, 1996; Goldstein, 1987, 1988, 2006; Husson and 
Louça, 2012; Korotayev and Grinin, 2012; Korotayev and Tsirel, 2010; Louçã, 
1997; Louçã and Reijnders, 1999; Mandel, 1995; Marchetti, 1980, 2006; 
O’Hara, 199 , 2001, 2005  Perez, 1983  Schumpeter, 1939; and Thompson and 
Zuk, 1982 are the main studies, often quoted in favor of the 
Kondratiev/Kondratieff hypotheses. 
 
Especially the idea of a deep and underlying link between the economic cycle 
and the global war cycle (if there is in reality any, we leave aside here), evoked 
the more recent attention not only of global social science, but also of very high-
ranking western military leadership circles (NATO), which even organized a 
workshop in Covilha, Portugal, on February 14 to 18, 2005 on that issue 
(Devezas, 2006). 
 
As de Groot and Franses, 2008, correctly remark: 
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“Over the years many different types of cycles have been hypothesized. Some 
well-known examples are the 3 to 4 year Kitchin inventory investment cycle, the 
7 to 11 year Juglar cycle which focuses on investment in machines, the 15 to 25 
year Kuznets cycle in migration and investment in construction and, of course, 
the 48 to 60 year Kondratieff cycle which mainly concerns structural economic 
development. Researchers like Goldstein and Modelski and Thompson claim 
that there are even longer 110 to 150 year cycles of hegemony.” (de Groot and 
Franses, 2008: 303] 
 
Flagship essays written by professional economists, using advanced econometric 
techniques of time-series analysis have come to very divergent and often 
negative assessments on the existence and relevance of “long cycles” of 
economics, let alone global politics. The mentioned essays, using advanced 
econometric methods, at least should name the publications by Diebolt, 2012; 
Diebolt and Doliger, 2006; Diebolt and Escudier, 2002; Silverberg, 2006; and 
van Ewijk, 1982; thus echoing the early criticism against the long 40-60 year 
“Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycle”, already voiced by Garvey, 1943; and Kuznets, 
1940. Even authors from the econometric research tradition, originally 
sympathetic to the general notion of Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycles, deny the 
existence of such fluctuations in the real economy, and rather talk about long 
swings of prices, like Berry, Kim and Baker, 2001; de Groot and Franses, 2008; 
Haustein and Neuwirth, 1982; and Van Ewijk, 1982; and prefer to talk about 
price cycles and not cycles of the real economy. The essay by Haustein and 
Neuwirth, 1982, is particularly interesting and also – in a way – is typical for the 
econometric mainstream results on the issue: spectral analysis was applied to 
long-time series of industrial production, energy consumption, inventions, 
innovations, and patents in order to reveal quantitative regularities in their 
behavior and/or in their interdependence.  
 
Spectral analysis is a statistical approach for analyzing stationary time series 
data in which the series is decomposed into cyclical or periodic components 
indexed by the frequency of repetition. Spectral analysis falls within the 
frequency domain approach to time series analysis. The spectral density function 
plays the central role and it summarizes the contributions of cyclical 
components to the variation of a stationary time series (Diebold, Kilian and 
Nerlove, 2013; Vogelsang, 2013). Our website 
http://uibk.academia.edu/ArnoTausch/Documentation-for-articles contains a 
non-mathematical primer on spectral analysis with many results from various 
simulated long cycles of different durations, and with results for different types 
of stronger or weaker “nested” cycles in the more overall swings in the recent 
research tradition of Devezas, 2012 (pages 160-163). 
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Haustein and Neuwirth, 1982 made an attempt to identify logistics within those 
time series. According to them, in the long cycle of 50–53 years, no significant 
autocorrelation could be detected. Logistics exist only in three special periods 
for innovations and inventions. Nondominant long cycles do appear in the 
interaction between innovations, production, patents, and energy consumption. 
The investigation shed light on the causal structure of the innovation system. In 
particular, it revealed a significant influence of industrial production on patents 
with a lag of nine years. But this, certainly, is not what adherents of the K-cycle 
hypothesis would have hoped for? As Berry, Kim and Baker state in their 2001 
essay: 
 
“One of the troubling characteristics of the long-wave literature is the equation 
of 56-year long waves (which Kondratiev explicitly associated with financial 
indicators) with waves of economic growth. This is wrong. As we teach our 
students in introductory economics, growth and development are different. It is 
the clusters of innovation that produce economic development that are 
associated with the long downwave, per Schumpeter, but the pulses of 
infrastructure building, capital outlays, and economic growth that flow from 
these innovation clusters come with the 18-year rhythms of the building cycle. 
Much of the confusion in the long-wave literature arises from this confusion of 
the rhythms of inflation and growth, and of the concepts of economic growth and 
economic development.” (Berry, Kim and Baker, 2001). 
 
In turn, flagship empirical analyses, using advanced econometric techniques, 
including, but not exclusively, spectral analysis in favor of parts or the totality of 
Kondratiev/Kondratieff’s contentions  i.e.  0-60 year swings in prices and the 
“real economy”) are Bornschier, 1996  Devezas, 2010, 2012  Devezas and 
Corredine, 2001; Forrester, 1977; Goldstein, 1987, 1988, 2006; Korotayev and 
Tsirel, 2010; Metz, 2011; Sterman, 1985, 1986; Tausch and Ghymers, 2007; and 
Tausch and Jourdon, 2011. A somewhat surprising turn of evidence is found in 
the essay published by Weber, 1981, which maintains a cycle of themes and 
values in advanced societies. De Groot and Franses, in their analysis of the 
dynamics of national product, industrial production, employment, consumer 
prices, wages, interest rates, population, and stock market indicators for the 
USA, the UK and the Netherlands since the 19
th
 Century, however sympathetic 
as they might have been to the notion of the K-cycle, come to the conclusion 
that in the USA there is a 40 year significant fluctuation of employment and a 60 
year fluctuation of prices and interest rates, but not of GDP or industrial 
production. In the UK, the situation is similar, and also in the Netherlands. A 
Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycle – their essay suggests – is rather a cycle of 
employment, interest rates, and perhaps wages, but certainly not an economic 
growth cycle per se (de Groot and Franses, 2008). 
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Rainer Metz comes up with a similar, rather pessimistic conclusion in his 2011 
essay: 
 
“Besides these methodological implications, our results also have strong 
substantial implications. First of all it is noted that regular long waves of the 
Kondratieff type in UK GDP do not exist if outliers are modelled correctly. GDP 
movement in the UK displays a trend with a variable mean growth rate, a fairly 
irregular business cycle with a period of about 11 years and several infrequently 
occurring exogenous shocks with persistent as well transitory effects. Obviously 
long-run growth follows a smooth trend with a variable mean growth rate 
(slope). The shocks causing this slope show long-term up- and downswings but 
without any regularity. This offers interesting perspectives for future research. 
First of all, such analysis should be extended to long-run GDP series for other 
countries. Second, the analysis should be extended to series other than GDP and 
also to series covering the pre-industrial period. If the results obtained in this 
article for UK GDP are then confirmed, we strongly recommend that ‘‘long 
waves’’ should not be considered as oscillating trend cycles but as a kind of 
growth dynamics without any regularity and analyse them in the framework of 
(unified) growth theory.” (Metz, 2011: 235) 
 
In view of the often bitter controversies surrounding the idea of longer 40-60 
year cycles, we have decided to re-assess the entire evidence, as far as it is 
possible, today, as the neat North American English saying goes, “from 
scratch”, and using a plurality of different methods. As it is well-known, the 
initiator of modern historical real purchasing power per capita statistics, 
Professor Angus Maddison, never believed himself even for a second in the 
existence of Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycles (Maddison, 2007; Devezas, 2012).  
 
To make matters worse, there is widespread disagreement even among members 
of the economics profession on the appropriate advanced quantitative methods 
to be used. A typical case in question is the already mentioned technique of 
spectral analysis, which for many was THE method par excellence to study long 
cycles just a few years ago. As Nathaniel Beck, a methodologist working in the 
field of political science, maintained still in 1991 with quite a strong dose of 
polemics against the mainstream of K-cycle-researchers: 
 
“Why don't analysts of cycles always use spectral analysis? After all, it is 
exactly the technique designed to decompose a stationary series into its cyclic 
components, and its statistical properties are excellent. I think the prime fault 
of spectral analysis is that it usually fails to find long social cycles. My own 
feeling is that this is shooting the messenger, but such practice is not 
unknown.” (Beck, 1991) 
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The temptation to use this method, now that it is universally available in the 
IBM-SPSS standard statistical software, implemented at many Universities 
around the world, is great; and it is even greater because the IBM-SPSS software 
just requires you to enter the original data and to get the results by simply 
clicking the proper pre-installed windows. 
 
But econometricians nowadays disagree on the continued appropriateness of this 
very methodology of spectral analysis as the adequate methodology to analyse 
data, testing the Kondratiev/Kondratieff hypotheses: 
 
“Spectral analysis thus involves a regularity of movements that is not verified 
and which, in addition, is not essential in affirming that they exist. In fact, the 
spectral analysis method cannot truly prove or refute the existence of 
socioeconomic cycles” (Diebolt, 2012: 122). 
 
Rainer Metz, another prominent theoretician of the art of econometric time 
series analysis, reaches in his 2011 article (Metz, 2011) the discomforting 
conclusion that no K-cycle in production exists, while in his book in 2008 
(Metz, 2008) he was still more optimistic, with the troughs in world industrial 
production growth given in 1820, 1880, and 1955 (smoothed component, long 
waves, Figure 4.3, Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5, page 165-166, Metz, 2008). 
Various filtering techniques and the (non)-elimination of the data for mining 
then, in 2008, did not change his final and resounding verdict on page 196 of his 
2008 book that K-cycles in the real economy indeed exist; with tests provided 
not only at the level of the world economy, but also at the level of Danish, 
French, German, Italian, Swedish, UK, and US data. But in 2011, the very same 
researcher, Rainer Metz, reaches a more pessimistic verdict on the validity of the 
K-cycle hypotheses.  
 
Our own humble approach will be very “down to earth”. We first re-analyze 
the existence of world economic and political cycles and then proceed to show 
the results of different time series analyses for the 31 countries with fairly 
complete Maddison data since the middle of the 1880s, i.e. Argentina; Australia; 
Austria; Belgium; Brazil; Canada; Chile; Colombia; Denmark; England/GB/UK; 
F. USSR/Russia; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Holland/ Netherlands; 
India; Indonesia (Java before 1880); Italy; Japan; New Zealand; Norway; Peru; 
Portugal; Spain; Sri Lanka; Sweden; Switzerland; Uruguay; USA; and 
Venezuela in Tables 3 and 4 of this paper and in the freely available Tables and 
Graphs in our Internet documentation 
(http://uibk.academia.edu/ArnoTausch/Documentation-for-articles).  
 
We then look at what might be termed the Akamatsu-paradoxon (following 
Akamatsu, 1961). That is: the true nature of the K-cycle is only revealed by 
looking at the patterns of ascent and decline in the world economy over a long 
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time period at the same time. So we will evaluate with a plurality of quantitative 
techniques the evolution of the real income gap of the 30/31 countries 
mentioned in relation to the world average, in relation to the highest and lowest 
income country in each year between 1885 and 2010 and in relation to the 
dominant country of the capitalist world economy, i.e. the United States of 
America; and alternately, the United Kingdom, and also with a UNDP type 
income index. We also calculated simple percentages of real incomes per capita 
in the other countries of the world as compared to the unweighted world 
averages from the late 19
th
 Century onwards. Thus we tested very exhaustively 
the hypothesis whether there is a “Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycle” of 
convergence or divergence in the countries of the world system, by applying 
spectral analysis, autocorrelation analysis and rolling regression/correlation 
analysis to these convergence data as well. By now at the latest, our readers will 
realize the massive character of evidence amassed in this project. 
 
In writing this piece, we have decided to write a non-mathematical article, which 
should be readable by a larger public, and not just small circles of economists 
and econometricians. Just as Camm et al., 1996, in their path-breaking analysis 
of heart rate variability, and Genzel and Cesarsky, 2000, in their astronomical 
analysis of extragalactic results from the infrared space observatory (two 
randomly chosen high-impact articles from the field of heart disease research 
and astronomy using spectral analysis), we use the very common standard 
mathematical-statistical procedure (spectral analysis), and we do not hesitate to 
use an entire array of other necessary statistical tests as well to assess the simple 
contention: are these deep crises in the capitalist world really a recurrent 
phenomenon, and is there at least the hope of some light at the end of the 
tunnel? Or are these lights, as the bitter Irish joke has it, only the headlamps of 
an approaching train? Or are the French econometricians Diebolt/Escudier 
correct in their very harshly formulated assumption that the long-term 
economic cycles of 40-60 years duration are comparable to the monster of 
“Loch Ness” and that they never existed nor do they exist (Diebolt/Escudier, 
2002)? 
 
Another methodological aspect can be mentioned only briefly: the question of 
filters in time series analysis. As the already mentioned renown German 
econometrician and economic historian Rainer Metz explained recently (Metz, 
2011), there are three unresolved questions in the entire debate: First, what are 
valid indicators for the long-wave phenomenon? Second, what time period 
should be analyzed? Third, are long waves to be conceived as cycles around the 
trend or oscillations of the trend itself? Most of the traditional approaches to 
long waves, Metz, 2011 argues, see them as regular 40- to 60-year cycles 
oscillating around a non-periodic secular trend and superimposed by shorter 
oscillations such as Juglar and Kitchin cycles. Only this conception of long 
waves—introduced by Kondratiev/Kondratieff and supported by Schumpeter—
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allows a statistical proof of the assumed regularity of long waves. But it 
requires: 
 
“[…] a statistical apparatus that can isolate such oscillations in historical time 
series from other cycles, from the trend and from irregular oscillations, which 
belong neither to the trend nor to cyclical oscillations. Another possibility for 
formalising long waves is to see them as an endogenous part of the secular 
movement itself.” (Metz, 2011). 
 
But regarding such efforts, the great Polish political economist Michal Kalecki 
once remarked already back in 1968: 
 
“The contemporary theory of growth of capitalist economies tends to consider 
this problem in terms of a moving equilibrium, which is frequently not checked 
for stability, rather than adopting an approach similar to that applied in the 
theory of business cycles. The latter consists of establishing two relations: one 
based on the impact of the effective demand generated by investment upon 
profits and the national income; and the other showing the determination of 
investment decisions by, broadly speaking, the level and the rate of change of 
economic activity. […] In fact, the long-run trend is but a slowly changing 
component of a chain of short-period situations; it has no independent entity, 
and the two basic relations mentioned above should be formulated in such a way 
as to yield the trend cum business-cycle phenomenon. It is true that the task is 
incomparably more difficult than in the case of another abstraction, that of the 
"pure business cycle" and, as will be seen below, the results of such an inquiry 
are less "mechanistic". This, however, is no excuse for dropping this approach, 
which seems to me the only key to the realistic analysis of the dynamics of a 
capitalist economy.”(Kalecki, 1968) 
 
The issue of filtering the data series requires therefore some further comments. 
Diebolt and Doliger (2006) recommend using the so-called Hodrick and Prescott 
filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1996) to apply to the data series before spectral 
analysis is being performed, because: 
 
“[…] in such a way it is possible a priori to consider that the spectrum of the 
filtered series is more representative” (Diebolt and Doliger, 2006: 41) 
 
However, another authoritative recent source in time series methodology, 
Cogley, 2013, comes out against using such filters, a reason, why we altogether 
abandoned this procedure in favor of the more simple and easily understandable 
Maddison time series data transformation into annual straightforward percentage 
growth rates. In addition to the methodological simplicity of this approach, it 
is also certain that political decision makers are primarily interested in 
annual GDP per capita growth rates, and not in filtered time series as such. 
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Cogley, 2013 correctly emphasizes that economic models are by definition 
incomplete representations of reality. To relate business cycle models to data, 
empirical macroeconomists frequently filter the untransformed GDP per capita 
etc. data prior to analysis to remove the growth component. Cogley, 2013 
mentions that until the 1980s, the most common way to do that was to estimate 
and subtract a deterministic linear trend. The desire to model permanent shocks 
in macroeconomic time series led  
 
“to the development of a variety of stochastic de-trending methods. […] Another 
popular way to measure business cycles involves application of band-pass and 
high-pass filters. […] In the business cycle literature, the work of Hodrick and 
Prescott (1997) and Baxter and King (1999) has been especially influential. […] 
While data filters are very popular, there is some controversy about whether 
they represent appealing definitions of the business cycle. For one, there is a 
disconnect between the theory and macroeconomic applications, for the theory 
applies to stationary random processes and applications involve non-stationary 
variables. […] In practice, of course, measured cycles are not perfectly 
predictable because actual filters only approximate the ideal. But this means 
that innovations in measured cycles are due solely to approximation errors in 
the filter, not to something intrinsic in the concept. The better the 
approximation, the closer the measures are to determinism. How to square this 
deterministic vision with stochastic general equilibrium models is not obvious. 
[…] Business cycle modellers also frequently abstract from trends. […] 
Contrary to intuition, trend-specification errors spread throughout the 
frequency domain and are not quarantined to low frequencies. That difference 
explains why the promising results on seasonality do not carry over to trend 
filtering. […] Finally, some economists question whether filter-based measures 
capture an important feature of business cycles. […] Trend reversion is a 
defining characteristic of the business cycle. […] Expected growth should be 
higher than average at the trough of a recession because agents can look 
forward to a period of catching up to compensate for past output losses. By the 
same token, expected growth should be lower than average at the peak of an 
expansion. […] Data filters are not for everyone. They are certainly convenient 
for constructing rough and ready measures of the business cycle, and they 
produce nice pictures when applied to US data. But some economists worry 
about the spurious cycle problem, especially in applications to business cycle 
models where the existence and properties of business cycles are points to be 
established.” (Cogley, 2013) 
 
After having been confronted with the fact that obviously the leading experts 
in econometrics, whose expertise has been consulted for the aims of this 
article, seem to agree nowadays that no “single shot” best method to test the 
relevance of Kondratiev/Kondratieff’s claims about a 40-60 year economic 
cycle exists (see especially Diebolt, 2012; Diebolt and Doliger, 2006; Metz, 
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2008, 2011; in contrast to the earlier optimism about the relevance of tests of 
autocorrelation and spectral density analysis, inherent in Beck, 1991), the 
author of this article arrived at the somewhat desperate conclusion that a 
“forensic approach” to long cycles, based on the application of several tests 
at once is perhaps more appropriate than the search for a rejection or 
confirmation of the K-cycle hypothesis by a single econometric method. If 
the existence of the monster at Loch Ness is so highly contested, different 
photographic devices, lenses, etc. must be used! 
 
Since the foundations of the application of all the methods in question to real 
existing time series of economic variables across time in several countries – 
especially spectral analysis, once considered being the best single approach – are 
nowadays questioned, such an application of a plurality of tests, ranging from 
tests of autocorrelation via periodograms from spectral analysis and the analysis 
of spectral density to the “poor man’s” time series analysis methodology of 
“rolling regressions” and “rolling correlations” will be applied, not to forget 
the simple, straight-forward visual inspection of the initial data series in 
question. 
 
Since the political class across the world is interested in concrete, tangible and 
easily readable results, we have chosen to opt for a straightforward additional 
choice, which will meet perhaps with criticism from the econometric time series 
analysis community: 
 
 Reproducing the periodograms from spectral density and the spectral 
density analysis graphs in terms of periods and not frequencies without 
any logarithmic transformations to make the time periods of the cycles 
more visible to the general public reading this article 
 
But our choice of a plurality of methods, based on autocorrelations, spectral 
analysis, and “rolling regressions”/”rolling correlations” would find the support 
of a vast number of studies in the field of time-series methodology, consulted for 
this article (Abadir and Talmain, 2002; Babetskii, Crowley, 2009; Komarek and 
Komarkova, 2007; Bartlett, 1946; Beck, 1991; Bloomfield, 1976; Box and 
Jenkins, 1976; Chu and Freund, 1996; Clark and West, 2006; Collard, 1999; 
Cryer, 1986; Dempster, 1969; Dittmar, Gavin and Kydland, 2005; Fuller, 1976; 
Junttila, 2001; Louçã and Reijnders, 1999; Quenouville, 1949; Silverberg, 2006; 
Zivot and Wang, 2006). 
 
Our article is based on the standard IBM-SPSS-20 time series analysis tools, and 
all the used methods and their mathematical algorithms are fully documented to 
the international public in IBM, 2011. For that reason, we refrain from 
reproducing the mathematical formula, which interested readers might easily 
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download from the freely available IBM internet documentation, 2011 (if they 
are not very familiar with the mathematical formula anyway): 
 
 As to correlations, we used the standard Pearson-Bravais correlation 
coefficients. In calculations not reported here also multivariate analyses 
(principal components) were used (Blalock, 1972; Dziuban and Shirkey, 
1974; Harman, 1976, and Rummel, 1970). “Rolling” regressions and 
correlations are quite a powerful and straightforward instrument of the 
analysis of time-series and became more popular in recent times in the 
framework of financial market trend analysis and the necessity to have 
easily interpretable and reliable instruments of analysis at hand (Perman 
and Tavera, 2005; Smith and Taylor, 2001; Tang, 2010; Zivot and Wang, 
2006, furthermore: Cook, 1977; Dempster, 1969; Velleman and Welsch, 
1981). Throughout this work, we use 25 year (Kondratiev/Kondratieff 
cycles, 2x25 years = 50 years) and 75 year periods (war cycles, 2x75 
years = 150 years) for the moving time window of regression/correlation 
analysis. We also used shorter windows to reproduce the Barro, the 
Kuznets and the Juglar cycles. 
 
 Our analyses of autocorrelation and cross-correlation are based on the 
standard IBM-SPSS ACF and CCF algorithm, which are based on 
Bartlett, 1946; Box and Jenkins, 1976; Cryer, 1986; and Quenouville, 
1949 (autocorrelation) and Box and Jenkins, 1976 (cross-correlation). 
Our graphs allow also for the inspection of longer time series. In 
presenting the graphs, we also took care of the better visibility of the 
significant results. 
 
 The IBM-SPSS spectral density routine, which is based on the 
methodological developments, presented by Bloomfield, 1976, and Fuller, 
1976 was performed by using the IBM-SPSS default options; the chosen 
window was most of the time the Tuckey-Hamming window with three 
periods. We also tested the validity of our main results with longer 
windows as well. As we demonstrate however in our non-mathematical 
primer on spectral density analysis, available at 
http://uibk.academia.edu/ArnoTausch/Documentation-for-articles, longer 
windows seem to distort the results even of simulated time series, where 
ex definitione we really know the length of the oscillations already 
beforehand, and they do not really help us to discover the real periodicity 
of the oscillations in question, especially when we are confronted with the 
already mentioned “Devezas” paradox of longer cycles and “nested” 
shorter cycles, presented in Devezas, 2012: 161. We use both the standard 
IBM-SPSS periodograms and the spectral density graphs, and add that 
standard econometric methodological literature usually maintains that the 
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periodograms are not the best estimator of the spectrum because it is not 
convergent (Diebolt, 2012).  
 
 
Results on the level of world industrial production 
growth since 1740 to 2011 
 
 
Our results on the level of the world economy are a resounding “yes” for 
the hypotheses voiced by Kondratiev/Kondratieff, but with several 
additional qualifications and extensions. Reasons of available journal printing 
space do not permit us to present all the results of this project, so we concentrate 
on only the most important tendencies and invite the specialists among our 
readers to the website http://uibk.academia.edu/ArnoTausch/Documentation-for-
articles with all the necessary data and results. 
 
Kondratiev/Kondratieff was right in analyzing a 54 year cycle of the real 
economy as well, but there are other important cycles too; some of them 
very well known to social science research, others perhaps still more to be 
explored.  
 
On the level of industrial production growth in the world economy, there is – 
parallel to the Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycle, a 1 0 year “logistic” cycle, first 
analyzed by Immanuel Wallerstein; and in addition, there is this new 36 year 
disaster cycle, correctly predicted by the neoclassical contemporary economist 
Robert Barro. For sure, there is also evidence – although somewhat weaker than 
expected – for a 22-23 year Kuznets cycle and the shorter, well-known Juglar 
cycles and Kitchin cycles. Graph 8 portrays the original data series from 1741 to 
2011, and Graph 8 the result of our “rolling correlation” exercise. 
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Graph 8: world industrial production growth, 1741 – 2011 – the 
untransformed annual growth raw data  
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Legend: our own calculations from the data set „Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycles and war 
cycles“ contained in http://uibk.academia.edu/ArnoTausch/Documentation-for-articles. As to 
the documentation, see also: Tausch and Ghymers, 2007, and Appendix 1 and 2 of this work. 
Our calculations are based on the IBM-SPSS XX and Microsoft EXCEL 2010 statistical 
software. 
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Graph 9: The “rolling” 25 year correlation analysis of these data reveals 
interesting results of the deeper underlying trends, 1741-2011: 
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Legend: our own calculations from the data set „Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycles and war 
cycles“ contained in http://uibk.academia.edu/ArnoTausch/Documentation-for-articles. As to 
the documentation, see also: Tausch and Ghymers, 2007, and Appendix 1 and 2 of this work. 
Our calculations are based on the IBM-SPSS XX and Microsoft EXCEL 2010 statistical 
software. 
 
 
Graph 10 and Graph 11 reproduce the main results of the spectral analysis of the 
cyclical movements in the original, untransformed data. The Kuznets cycle, the 
Barro cycle, the Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycle and the Wallerstein logistic cycle 
are all confirmed in their existence. Appendix (3) mentions results, which relied 
on a prior 5-year moving average transformation of the original data in the 
tradition of the important Korotayev and Tsirel, 2010 study. 
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Graph 10: The periodogram from IBM-SPSS spectral analysis: short-term 
fluctuations, the Kuznets cycles, the Barro cycles, the 
Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycles, and a 130-140 year cycle (Wallenstein’s 
“logistic cycle”) 
 
 
 
 
Legend: our own calculations from the data set „Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycles and war 
cycles“ contained in http://uibk.academia.edu/ArnoTausch/Documentation-for-articles. As to 
the documentation, see also: Tausch and Ghymers, 2007, and Appendix 1 and 2 of this work. 
Our calculations are based on the IBM-SPSS XX and Microsoft EXCEL 2010 statistical 
software. 
 
 
Periodogram 
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Graph 11: spectral density analysis of world industrial production growth, 
1741-2011 
 
 
 
Legend: our own calculations from the data set „Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycles and war 
cycles“ contained in http://uibk.academia.edu/ArnoTausch/Documentation-for-articles. As to 
the documentation, see also: Tausch and Ghymers, 2007, and Appendix 1 and 2 of this work. 
Our calculations are based on the IBM-SPSS XX and Microsoft EXCEL 2010 statistical 
software. 
 
 
Thus spectral density analysis of the untransformed global data indeed suggests 
that, on the world level, there are all the cycles at work, which have been 
discussed for decades now in economic research. Also autocorrelation analysis 
supports the claims of the K-cycle researchers: 
 
Spectral density graph with a 
standard IBM-SPSS Tuckey-
Hamming window of 3 periods 
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Graph 12: autocorrelation analysis of world industrial production growth, 
1741-2011 
 
 
 
 
Legend: our own calculations from the data set „Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycles and war 
cycles“ contained in http://uibk.academia.edu/ArnoTausch/Documentation-for-articles. As to 
the documentation, see also: Tausch and Ghymers, 2007, and Appendix 1 and 2 of this work. 
Our calculations are based on the IBM-SPSS XX and Microsoft EXCEL 2010 statistical 
software. 
 
 
Graph 13 draws the attention of our readers to a type of cycle, really neglected 
in empirical K-wave research: the Wallerstein logistic cycle, whose shape 
suggests that the current crisis heralds the beginning of a trough along the 
oscillations of this cycle. In terms of its statistical qualities, this cycle is about 
equal in strength to the Kondratiev/Kondratieff-cycle. There is strong reason to 
believe that the Wallerstein cycle is closely connected to the issue of leadership 
in the international system. The period from the end of the Napoleonic Wars to 
Autocorrelation analysis 
result plot. Number of lags 
ranges up to 281 
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the Great Depression in the 1930s was the period of the British dominance in the 
world economy, while the US hegemony evolved as a result of World War II 
and seems to be declining: 
 
 
 
Graph 13: The Wallerstein logistic cycle – 75 year rolling regressions 
 
 
 
 
Legend: our own calculations from the data set „Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycles and war 
cycles“ contained in http://uibk.academia.edu/ArnoTausch/Documentation-for-articles. As to 
the documentation, see also: Tausch and Ghymers, 2007, and Appendix 1 and 2 of this work. 
Our calculations are based on the IBM-SPSS XX and Microsoft EXCEL 2010 statistical 
software. 
 
 
In Appendix 3, we also document our results based on a 5-year moving averages 
research design, based on the original data. The 5 year moving averages design 
should serve to replicate the results, achieved by Korotayev and Tsirel, 2010, 
who also used such 5-year moving averages. Also this exercise neatly 
reproduces our results mentioned above. The Kuznets, Barro, 
Kondratiev/Kondratieff and Wallerstein cycles re-appear in the 
periodogram for that research design (see also our periodogram for the 
periods 0 – 70 years with a wider spread); while there is also a confirmation 
of our hypothesis about the Kuznets, Barro, Kondratiev/Kondratieff and 
Wallerstein cycles in the spectral density graphs under the assumption of a 
window (Tukey-Hamming) of three periods. In the spectral density diagram, 
the IBM-SPSS results suggest to talk about a cycle length of 45 years for the 
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Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycle, but in accordance with the periodogram, the 
analysis of autocorrelation suggests a longer cycle. The strength of the 
Wallerstein cycle is again shown to be considerable. 
 
In the following, we will test the validity of another major contention of 
contemporary K-cycle research, the assertion of war cycles, made tremendously 
popular internationally by the works of Goldstein, 1985, 1987, 1988, 1991, 
2006; although Goldstein in one of his later major works (Goldstein 2011) 
distances himself from the certain determinism which might have been evident 
in the international reception of his earlier work. And he now believes that 
humanity can be at the brink of abolishing war. 
 
 
Results on the level of major power wars in the 
world system since 1495  
 
 
Our data about major power war in the global system, as we stated, are an 
extension of the Goldstein 1988 data set about battle fatalities from major power 
wars (i.e. the 5 current permanent members of the UN Security Council + 
Germany) from 1495 onwards. From 1946 onwards, we used the PRIO, Oslo 
data, reported in Tausch and Ghymers, 2007, since the Goldstein data stop in 
1975, while the PRIO/Tausch/Ghymers data cover the period 1946 – 2002. To 
make the battle fatality rates comparable over time and to correct for the 
advances of international weapons technologies as well as practices of general 
conscription since the French Revolution, which all caused an exponential 
increase of annual battle fatalities from major power wars in the 20
th
 Century, 
we decided to calculate the fourth root of this variable. 
 
Interested readers will find, however, similar other results at their disposal as 
well, which are based on the original untransformed annual major power wars 
battle fatalities data series, and on a series which is based on the 10
th
 root of the 
battle fatalities variable. Our chosen transformation properly highlights the 
intensity of earlier terrible wars in human history, like the Thirty Years War and 
the War of Spanish Succession, and makes a comparison to the destructive 
character of the wars of the 20
th
 Century more feasible than other mathematical 
transformations of the war intensity variable. War intensity under the 
formulation of the 4
th
 root does not have a rising or falling trend over the time 
axis and thus better allows to analyze the real fluctuations of war intensity over 
time: 
 
(1) Untransformed war intensity: y = 0,4165x - 32,636 
R² = 0,0487 
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(2) 4th root war intensity: y = 0,0002x + 1,7307 
R² = 0,0005 
 
(3) 10th root war intensity: y = -0,0007x + 1,2304 
R² = 0,0273 
 
Commenting on the results, we would like to say that still there is a seemingly 
alarming connection between the 75-year rolling correlation trend of the war 
cycle and the 75-year rolling correlation trend of the Wallerstein economic 
cycle. Major world economic depressions have such a Tsunami force that they 
destabilize the entire international system as well. Graph 14 reproduces these 
trends, although we should also emphasize at this point that our econometric 
time series data, based on cross-correlation (CCF) reveal no significant direct 
connection between the war variable (the fourth root of battle fatalities from 
major power wars) and the global economic variable (annual growth of world 
industrial production).  
 
 
Graph 14: The Wallerstein cycle and the trend towards warfare in the 
international system  
 
 
 
 
Legend: our own calculations from the data set „Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycles and war 
cycles“ contained in http://uibk.academia.edu/ArnoTausch/Documentation-for-articles. As to 
the documentation, see also: Tausch and Ghymers, 2007, and Appendix 1 and 2 of this work. 
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Our calculations are based on the IBM-SPSS XX and Microsoft EXCEL 2010 statistical 
software. 
 
 
Graph 15 no shows the results from the rolling correlation analysis of the 
untransformed battle fatalities rate in history since the end of the Middle Ages, 
again showing – as Goldstein, 1988, so correctly emphasized – the peaks of the 
international conflagrations in the Thirty Years War, the French wars of the 18
th
 
Century, the Napoleonic Wars, and the German quest for global dominance, 
1914-1945 and the evolution of the postwar order with the Korean and Vietnam 
Wars: 
 
 
Graph 15: the cycle of warfare in the international system 
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Legend: our own calculations from the data set „Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycles and war 
cycles“ contained in http://uibk.academia.edu/ArnoTausch/Documentation-for-articles. As to 
the documentation, see also: Tausch and Ghymers, 2007, and Appendix 1 and 2 of this work. 
Our calculations are based on the IBM-SPSS XX and Microsoft EXCEL 2010 statistical 
software. 
 
 
Graph 16a and Graph 16b reproduces the time series plots, and Graph 17 and 
Graph 18 the results of the spectral analysis procedure, based on the 4
th
 root of 
the intensity of warfare variable. Our data clearly support the hypothesis of 
longer waves of wars in the international system, which is part and parcel of 
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contemporary world system research ( our own calculations from the data set 
„Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycles and war cycles“ contained in 
http://uibk.academia.edu/ArnoTausch/Documentation-for-articles. As to the 
documentation, see also: Tausch and Ghymers, 2007, and Appendix 1 and 2 of 
this work. Our calculations are based on the IBM-SPSS XX and Microsoft 
EXCEL 2010 statistical software). 
 
Spectral analysis clearly reveals a 160 year cycle of global warfare, which was 
already evident in the earlier research by Goldstein, 1985, 1987, 1988, 1991, and 
2006 on the subject. The “illusion of cycles”-type of literature, initiated by 
Beck, 1991, thus has to be refuted. 
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Graph 16a: The war cycle in the international system – intensity of major power wars^.25 
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Graph 16b: The war cycle in the international system – intensity of major power wars 
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Graph 17: periodogram of war intensity since 1495  
 
 
 
 
Legend: our own calculations from the data set „Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycles and war 
cycles“ contained in http://uibk.academia.edu/ArnoTausch/Documentation-for-articles. As to 
the documentation, see also: Tausch and Ghymers, 2007, and Appendix 1 and 2 of this work. 
Our calculations are based on the IBM-SPSS XX and Microsoft EXCEL 2010 statistical 
software. 
 
 
Periodogram 
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Graph 18: spectral density analysis of war intensity since 1495  
 
 
 
 
Legend: our own calculations from the data set „Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycles and war 
cycles“ contained in http://uibk.academia.edu/ArnoTausch/Documentation-for-articles. As to 
the documentation, see also: Tausch and Ghymers, 2007, and Appendix 1 and 2 of this work. 
Our calculations are based on the IBM-SPSS XX and Microsoft EXCEL 2010 statistical 
software. 
 
 
In the following paragraphs, we will now look more closely into the results of 
the analysis of the Maddison data and the cyclical fluctuations of the Akamatsu 
type. 
 
To present the original growth data or convergence data, the diagrams with the 
periodogram, the spectral density graphs, the autocorrelation plots and the 
rolling correlation plots would require for each of the 31 nations in the world 5 
graphs for each country, that is to say 155 graphs for the Maddison economic 
growth data and 155 graphs for the Maddison convergence data, i.e. 310 graphs. 
Spectral density graph with 
a Tukey-Hamming 
window of 3 periods 
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Of course this is way past any content limit in international social science 
journals. The author of this article does not preclude the possibility to present 
these results in a later book publication, but already now makes all these data 
and graphs available for global scholarship at 
http://uibk.academia.edu/ArnoTausch/Documentation-for-articles. We will thus 
concentrate in the following on the interpretation of the main results. 
 
 
New evidence on economic cycles in 31 countries of 
the world system and the discovery of the Akamatsu 
cycle 
 
 
Tables 3 and 4 present the main results of our analysis of the Maddison data set. 
Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycles of around 60 years duration are most clearly 
visible in the periodograms for Argentina, Canada, and Russia. These 
periodograms and other econometric time series tests are available from 
http://uibk.academia.edu/ArnoTausch/Documentation-for-articles. 
 
We also found evidence on the existence of longer cycles of more than 35 years 
in  
 
Belgium 
Chile 
Greece 
Netherlands 
India 
New Zealand 
Spain 
USA 
 
while for the other countries, the spectral density analysis results reported 
in Diebolt and Doliger, 2006 could not be falsified. 
 
The hypothesis, why there are such differences in cycle length between the 
various countries of the world, has to be found: a simple center-periphery or 
machinery exporter versus raw material exporter dychotomy does not apply, and 
also other factors, such as GDP per capita, education also would not explain the 
difference. An interesting hypothesis could be the application of Bornschier’s 
dependency theory, centered around penetration by transnational capital in the 
different economies of the world and the weakness or strength of “national 
capital” (Bornschier and Chase-Dunn, 1985; Tausch, 2010). By and large, the 
role of transnational capital in the countries with longer cycles seems to be 
historically more pronounced  than in the countries with shorter cycles, and the 
strength or weakness of the national bourgeoisie seems to determine the 
shortness or length of cycles. Tpyical cases, supporting such an interpretation 
would be the short cycles in France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, and 
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Switzerland versus the long cycles in Argentina, Canada, Chile, Greece, India, 
New Zealand, Spain and Russia. 
 
Table 2: The Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycles in the countries of the world 
system 
 
 
xx Cycle length (years) K-cycles, as suggested by 
the Periodograms 
Argentina  20 and 60 
Australia  20 and 30 
Austria  20 
Belgium  20 and 38 
Brazil  20 and 30 
Canada 18 and 58 
Chile  15 and 38 
Colombia  20 and 30 
Denmark  15 and 30 
UK 15 and 30 
Russia 18 and 22 and 58 
Finland  25 
France 18 
Germany  14 and 22 
Greece  15 and 25 and 40 
Netherlands  20 and 40 
India  25 and 40 
Indonesia 20 
Italy  18 
Japan  15 
New Zealand 20 and 40 
Norway  18 and 30 
Peru  20 
Portugal  30 
Spain  40 
Sri Lanka 15 
Sweden  16 
Switzerland  16 
Uruguay 20 
USA 20 and 40 
Venezuela 20 
 
For the 31 nations trajectories, see http://uibk.academia.edu/ArnoTausch/Documentation-for-
articles.  
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Appendix 4 and 5 as well as the numerous other background data, presented in 
http://uibk.academia.edu/ArnoTausch/Documentation-for-articles highlight the 
Akamatsu cycles in 31 countries of the world economy since 1885. 
 
In Table 3, we test the crucial relationships of the Akamatsu cycles and the cross 
correlation relationship between the Akamatsu cycle and the 
Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycle.  
 
In Argentina, Austria, Italy, and Venezuela there are either clear linear overall 
convergences (Austria) or divergences (Argentina), and in Italy and in 
Venezuela, as well as in Russia, convergence had the shape of an inverted “U”. 
Akamatsu cyclical oscillations are shortest in Spain, and longest in Russia, 
and the ascending order of implied Akamatsu cycle length is given by the 
following list of countries: 
 
 
1. Spain  
2. Uruguay 
3. Denmark  
4. Norway  
5. Sweden  
6. Chile  
7. Canada 
8. Finland  
9. Japan  
10. New Zealand 
11. Portugal  
12. Australia  
13. Germany  
14. Switzerland  
15. India  
16. Indonesia 
17. Belgium  
18. Brazil  
19. UK 
20. France 
21. Greece  
22. Netherlands  
23. Peru  
24. Sri Lanka 
25. Colombia  
26. Russia 
 
 
Cross correlation analysis also reveals that in 
 
 
Spain  
Denmark  
Finland  
Australia  
Greece  
Netherlands  
Argentina 
 
there is a clear priority of the cyclical Akamatsu movements over the 
economic growth rates, while in the other countries the 
Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycle determines the Akamatsu cycle. Only further 
research can clarify whether these differences are to be explained by the 
structure of exports, the role of raw material exports in the economic processes 
etc. Thus in  
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Austria  
Belgium  
Brazil  
Canada 
Chile  
Colombia  
France 
Germany  
India  
Indonesia 
Italy  
Japan  
New Zealand 
Norway  
Peru  
Portugal  
Russia 
Sri Lanka 
Sweden  
Switzerland  
UK 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
 
there was a clear priority role of the Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycle over the 
Akamatsu cycle.  
 
 
Table 3: The length of the Akamatsu cycles and the relationship between 
the K-cycles and the Akamatsu cycles in 30 countries of the world 
 
 
 Cycle length (years) 
Akamatsu cycles, as 
suggested by the 
periodograms based on the 
original convergence data 
with the US 
time series cross-correlation 
analysis suggests the 
following causality 
Argentina  no significant result A->K 
Australia  20 and 40 A->K 
Austria  no significant result K->A 
Belgium  40 K->A 
Brazil  40 K->A 
Canada 30 K->A 
Chile  25 K->A 
Colombia  60 K->A 
Denmark  20 and 30 A->K 
UK 40 K->A 
Russia 60 K->A 
Finland  30 A->K 
France 40 K->A 
Germany  20 and 40 K->A 
Greece  40 A->K 
Netherlands  40 A->K 
India  30 and 40 K->A 
Indonesia 30 and 40 K->A 
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Italy  no significant result K->A 
Japan  30 K->A 
New Zealand 30 K->A 
Norway  20 and 30 K->A 
Peru  40 K->A 
Portugal  30 K->A 
Spain  18 A->K 
Sri Lanka 40 K->A 
Sweden  20 and 30 K->A 
Switzerland  25 and 40 K->A 
Uruguay 20 K->A 
Venezuela no significant result K->A 
 
For the 31 nations trajectories, see http://uibk.academia.edu/ArnoTausch/Documentation-for-
articles  
 
Table 4 highlights another important consequence of our research for the study 
of world system dynamics. In that Table, we highlight the “convergence 
slopes” of the countries of the world system with available data in terms of their 
GDP per capita distance, parity or superiority with the county, which dominated 
the capitalist world system right to the time of the Great Depression, the United 
Kingdom. Table 4 highlights the dramatic singularity of Keynesian postwar 
European reconstruction, and it also shows that since the 1990s, other 
mechanisms have set in, which clearly are to the detriment of countries of the 
European Union, and which benefit, among others, some countries of 
neoliberalism. We highlight these tendencies in Table 4 as well as in Appendix 
6, which presents the country graphs for the changing logic of global 
capitalist development since 1885. These data are also a possible important 
input for future cross-national development research. Multiple regression 
designs on the explanation of economic growth and convergence today most 
probably will lead to different results for such explanatory variables as state 
sector influence or MNC Penetration during, say, 1954 and 1973 and 1974 to 
1992 or 1993 to 2010. It is even feasible that each period has its own “correct” 
economic theory, with Keynesian strategies being most successful in the 
postwar period. We present the following list of the three best and worst 
performers for the periods: 
 
 
Best convergence performers (reference point: purchasing power per capita 
in the United Kingdom): 
 
 
cycle 1885-1913: convergence superstars: 
 
 
Canada 
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Switzerland  
USA 
 
 
cycle 1914-1932: convergence superstars: 
 
 
Venezuela 
Switzerland  
Holland/Netherlands  
 
 
cycle 1933-1953: convergence superstars: 
 
 
Venezuela 
USA 
Canada 
 
 
cycle 1954-1973: convergence superstars: 
 
 
Japan  
Italy  
Greece  
 
 
cycle 1974-1992: convergence superstars: 
 
 
Japan  
Italy  
Greece  
 
 
cycle 1993-2010: convergence superstars: 
 
 
USSR/Russia 
Finland  
Chile  
 
 
In the same way, we can also analyze the worst time series performances in 
relationship to the United Kingdom:  
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Worst convergence performers (reference point: purchasing power per 
capita in the United Kingdom): 
 
 
cycle 1885-1913: worst convergence failures: 
 
 
Australia  
Holland/Netherlands  
Greece 
 
 
cycle 1914-1932: worst convergence failures: 
 
 
New Zealand  
Chile  
Australia 
 
 
cycle 1933-1953: worst convergence failures: 
 
 
Greece  
Germany  
Japan 
 
 
cycle 1954-1973: worst convergence failures: 
 
 
Venezuela 
Uruguay 
New Zealand 
 
 
cycle 1974-1992: worst convergence failures: 
 
 
Venezuela 
Argentina  
New Zealand 
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cycle 1993-2010: worst convergence failures: 
 
 
Japan  
Italy  
Switzerland 
 
 
Table 4 and Appendix 6 provide the more in depth-analysis of these strategically 
important questions: 
 
 
Table 4: The Akamatsu cycle and convergence with the United Kingdom – 
convergence slopes in the Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycles, 1885-2010 
 
 
 
 cycle 1885-
1913 
cycle 1914-
1932 
cycle 1933-
1953 
cycle 1954-
1973 
cycle 1974-
1992 
cycle 
1993-
2010 
Argentina  0,519 0,961 0,154 -0,003 -1,734 -0,495 
Australia  -0,474 -0,055 0,814 0,502 -0,404 -0,139 
Austria  0,405 1,024 0,075 1,575 0,192 -0,317 
Belgium  0,009 1,527 -0,222 1,255 -0,153 -0,552 
Brazil  -0,159 0,290 0,258 0,279 -0,387 -0,219 
Canada 1,360 0,125 2,427 0,632 -0,494 -0,435 
Chile  0,400 -0,073 0,412 -0,243 0,042 0,376 
Colombia  -0,130 0,728 0,126 -0,099 -0,106 -0,198 
Denmark  0,707 1,631 0,229 1,363 -0,108 -1,143 
USSR/Russi
a 
0,195 0,456 0,552 0,472 -0,798 0,516 
Finland  0,316 1,104 0,621 1,407 0,342 0,479 
France 0,324 1,645 0,170 1,658 -0,281 -1,042 
Germany  0,486 1,093 -0,847 1,468 -0,185 -1,061 
Greece  -0,171 1,377 -0,878 1,767 -0,290 0,357 
Holland/Net
herlands  
-0,229 2,032 -0,033 1,125 -0,615 -0,494 
India  -0,021 0,014 -0,186 -0,078 0,041 0,276 
Indonesia 
(Java before 
1880) 
-0,054 0,190 -0,309 -0,062 0,156 -0,044 
Italy  0,069 0,597 0,184 2,005 0,489 -1,376 
Japan  0,163 0,432 -0,524 3,545 1,230 -1,711 
New 
Zealand  
0,693 -0,765 1,199 -0,566 -1,229 -0,393 
Norway  0,171 1,066 0,847 0,845 0,773 -0,504 
Peru  0,306 0,651 0,200 0,072 -1,038 0,155 
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Portugal  -0,096 0,472 0,078 1,410 0,560 -0,544 
Spain  -0,062 0,660 -0,337 1,630 0,181 -0,187 
Sri Lanka 0,050 0,058 -0,170 -0,224 0,150 0,249 
Sweden  0,595 1,334 1,250 1,104 -0,639 0,245 
Switzerland  1,132 2,110 -0,239 0,887 -1,187 -1,213 
Uruguay -0,029 1,329 0,787 -1,495 -0,398 -0,219 
USA 0,921 0,987 2,808 0,384 0,103 -1,007 
Venezuela -0,135 2,742 3,274 -1,510 -2,513 -0,711 
 
 
 
For the 31 nations trajectories, see http://uibk.academia.edu/ArnoTausch/Documentation-for-
articles  
 
 
New insights into the Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycle 
dating game 
 
 
Our research also sheds lights on the necessary reformulation of 
Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycle dating schemes and the assessment of the current 
crisis, which began in 2007. As we show in Graph 19, there is good reason to 
believe that the current crisis is NOT a Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycle trough 
(which hit the world economy in the late 1980s, culminating in the 
disintegration of Communist rule in Eastern Europe and the end of the Soviet 
Union), but a downswing phase of the 140 year Wallerstein cycle: 
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Graph 19: the 54 year Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycle and the 140 year 
Wallerstein cycle since 1950 
 
 
 
 
Legend: our own calculations from the data set „Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycles and war 
cycles“ contained in http://uibk.academia.edu/ArnoTausch/Documentation-for-articles. As to 
the documentation, see also: Tausch and Ghymers, 2007, and Appendix 1 and 2 of this work. 
Our calculations are based on the IBM-SPSS XX and Microsoft EXCEL 2010 statistical 
software. 
 
 
Graph 20 and Graph 21 show that the big difference between the current crisis 
and the Great Depression starting in 1929 is that in 1929, ALL cycle troughs 
coincided, while in the crisis of 2007, such an occurrence of ALL the cyclical 
troughs at once is just not the case. This is the main reason why the current crisis 
is far from being the “final crisis of capitalism”, and why social science today 
can learn a lot from Kondratiev/Kondratieff’s stubborn resistance to similar 
conceptions advanced at the time of the Great Depression.  
 
 55 
 
Graph 20: The unique character of the Great Depression, 1929: all cycles 
hit the world economy at once 
 
 
rolling correlation windows: 
 
8 = 16 year Juglar cycle 
11 = 22 year Kuznets cycle 
18 = 36 year Barro cycle (secondary axis, right hand scale) 
27 = 54 year Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycle (secondary axis, right hand scale) 
70 = 140 year Wallerstein cycle (secondary axis, right hand scale) 
 
 
 
 
Legend: our own calculations from the data set „Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycles and war 
cycles“ contained in http://uibk.academia.edu/ArnoTausch/Documentation-for-articles. As to 
the documentation, see also: Tausch and Ghymers, 2007, and Appendix 1 and 2 of this work. 
Our calculations are based on the IBM-SPSS XX and Microsoft EXCEL 2010 statistical 
software. 
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Graph 21: By contrast: in 2007, the world economy was NOT affected by 
such a unique combination of downward trends 
 
 
 
 
Legend: our own calculations from the data set „Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycles and war 
cycles“ contained in http://uibk.academia.edu/ArnoTausch/Documentation-for-articles. As to 
the documentation, see also: Tausch and Ghymers, 2007, and Appendix 1 and 2 of this work. 
Our calculations are based on the IBM-SPSS XX and Microsoft EXCEL 2010 statistical 
software. 
 
 
Another interesting point to be mentioned here is what social science can offer 
to the policy makers at the level of the G-8, the G-20, the European Union, the 
OECD and other institutions of democratic global governance in terms of the 
lessons one can draw about the most successful and the least successful 
strategies to confront the crises in 1929 and 2007. 
 
 
Exits from the crisis 
 
 
Our main policy conclusions can be found in the messages, conveyed by Graphs 
22 and 23, and Table 5. Our K-cycle analysis suggests that India, Russia, and 
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Peru are the Maddison sample countries most successfully diving out from the 
depths of the crisis, while indeed Portugal, Italy and Spain are the Maddison 
countries most seriously affected by the current downturn. A UNDP type GDP 
per capita index, comparing the GDP per capita of any Maddison country any 
time since 1885
6
 neatly informs us about the real extent of progress along global 
convergence. The four countries with the most consistent and stable 
convergence path in human history did practice many policy receipts, which are 
a “forbidden medicine” for neoliberal economics – the Scandinavian social 
Keynesian models Norway, Finland, Sweden and Denmark, combining a fair 
amount of social spending, investment in human capital, free trade, and a 
political partnership between wage labor and capital, tending towards wage rises 
in tandem with the growth of productivity. Their historical progress to stable 
democracy, humanism and well-being is really unparalleled. They all started out 
belonging to the lower half of purchasing power per capita in the world, and 
they all belong now to the highest 1/3 of countries.  
 
 
Graph 22: the K-cycle (rolling 25 year correlations) of three most 
unfortunate semi-peripheries: Portugal, Italy and Spain 
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For the 31 nations trajectories, see http://uibk.academia.edu/ArnoTausch/Documentation-for-
articles  
 
                                                 
6
 with the respective lowest GDP per capita, divided by the difference between the highest and the lowest GDP 
per capita for each year 
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Graph 23: UNDP type GDP per capita Index, 1886 – 2010 for the countries 
with the most consistent path of ascent in the world economy 
 
 
 
 
For the 31 nations trajectories, see http://uibk.academia.edu/ArnoTausch/Documentation-for-
articles  
 
 
The systematic comparison of the effects of the 2007 crisis (purchasing power 
per capita in 2010 as compared to purchasing power per capita in 1995) show to 
us that Japan, Italy, Denmark, France and Germany are the biggest losers, while 
Finland, Russia, Sweden, Chile and Uruguay were the biggest winners. 
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Table 5: Emerging from the global crisis 
 
 GDP per capita 
as a % of global 
GDP per capita 
1995 
GDP per capita as a 
% of global GDP 
per capita 2010 
Losses or gains in 
% 
Japan  149,04 126,97 -22,07 
Italy  129,13 107,20 -21,93 
Denmark  152,63 136,10 -16,53 
France 136,97 124,31 -12,65 
Germany  129,74 119,59 -10,15 
Switzerland  154,95 144,90 -10,05 
Venezuela 66,23 57,15 -9,08 
USA 184,78 176,49 -8,29 
Portugal  87,11 82,65 -4,45 
New Zealand  111,82 109,32 -2,50 
Spain  98,49 97,23 -1,26 
Belgium  137,03 136,35 -0,67 
Colombia  41,03 40,88 -0,14 
Canada 144,29 144,37 0,08 
Norway  161,84 162,00 0,16 
Brazil  39,60 39,82 0,22 
Netherlands  140,23 140,67 0,44 
Argentina  58,40 59,36 0,97 
Indonesia 25,31 27,33 2,03 
Austria  135,72 139,47 3,75 
UK 131,90 137,63 5,73 
Peru  26,80 33,42 6,62 
Greece  77,41 85,04 7,63 
India  11,57 19,52 7,95 
Sri Lanka 22,28 31,03 8,74 
Australia  138,98 148,09 9,11 
Uruguay 57,59 66,72 9,12 
Chile  66,83 80,36 13,53 
Sweden  132,35 146,48 14,13 
Russia 30,18 44,76 14,58 
Finland  119,83 134,81 14,98 
 
Legend: our own compilations, based on the Maddison data sets, as documented in Bolt and 
van Zanden, 2013. Calculated from the original data with Microsoft EXCEL 2010 
 
 
In the following, we will also try to draw some conclusions into our insights 
about hegemonial contenders and their structural positions in the world 
economy, then, during the Great Depression, and nowadays. By comparing their 
historical trajectories, we of course would not like to commit the error of “the 
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poverty of historicism” (Popper, 1961). On the contrary, we would simply like 
to draw our readers’ attention to the various Scyllas and Charybdis, which 
nations might face emerging from crises and non-democratic previous political 
systems on their possible transition path towards a socio-liberal, open society 
and full-scale democracy. 
 
 
Predictions about the hegemonial contenders and the 
global hegemons in the 21
st
 Century 
 
 
Graph 25 shows the striking parallels between the global order in the six 
decades before 1940 (i.e. 1885-1940) and before 2010. Both Germany and 
Russia experienced a considerable decline during the world crisis of the 1920s 
(Germany-Weimar Republic) and the 1980s and early 1990s (Russia today), and 
both countries find another, formerly very poor and rising hegemonial contender 
among the nations of the international system on their side.  
 
Graph 25: The comparison of hegemonial contenders, 1885-1940 and 1950-
2010. Their GDP per capita in purchasing power in relationship to the 
world average of 31 countries  
 
 
 
 
Primary axis: Germany and Japan  
Secondary axis: Russia, Brazil, China and India 
The same kind of lost national pride due to 
the effects of the global crisis – Germany 
in the 1920s, and Russia in the 1990s 
Japan and China share in their 
history that their industrialization 
started at relatively low levels of 
capitalist development. 
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Legend: our own compilations, based on the Maddison data sets, as documented in Bolt and 
van Zanden, 2013. Calculated from the original data with Microsoft EXCEL 2010 
 
Not only the possible hegemonial contenders (Germany and Japan prior to 
World War II; Russia and China in the contemporary period) have many world 
economic characteristics in common; also the hegemons (UK before 1940; the 
US before the crisis of 2007) were on comparable global trajectories: both 
experienced a history of sharp hegemonial decline (in the UK interrupted by the 
temporary rally during World War I). And both nations managed to have a 
hegemonial temporary recovery associated with the names of the UK-Prime 
Ministers Stanley Baldwin and Ramsey MacDonald, and the US-Presidents 
Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush and William J. Clinton. 
 
 
Graph 26: The comparison of the trajectories of the world hegemons, 1885-
1940 (UK) and 1950-2010 (the USA). Their GDP per capita in purchasing 
power in relationship to the world average of 31 countries 
 
 
 
 
Legend: our own compilations, based on the Maddison data sets, as documented in Bolt and 
van Zanden, 2013. Calculated from the original data with Microsoft EXCEL 2010 
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Implications for Russia 
 
 
So should Russia follow the footsteps of the Weimar Republic and the later 
hegemonial challenge against the West, or try to find a “Scandinmavian path”? 
Given the limitations of journal space, it would not be possible to present here 
the details of the debates among the Marxist classics of the early 20
th
 Century on 
the proper development strategies to follow once Labor has won a decisive 
influence in the political system of a country. As has been shown already in 
Tausch and Prager, 1992, the European social democrats, above all the Austrian 
Otto Bauer and the Swede Ernst Wigforss, were correct in emphasizing a path of 
slow and fundamental democratic reforms, while Lenin, from the very start, 
harshly criticized the social democrats, overlooking the powerful societal 
tradeoffs between reforms and economic growth, and political stability. Not only 
that: while agricultural and educational reform, an army, based on general 
conscription and democratic control, social security, public health etc. are all 
mighty drivers of economic growth in a democratic and free society, the 
European social democrats of the early 20
th
 Century were also very correct in 
emphasizing the long-term limitations of unlimited state power, with Otto Bauer 
clearly predicting, already in 1920, the subsequent state terror under Bolshevik 
power in Russia. 
 
Graphs 27a and 27b show the dramatic truth of these predictions and debates in 
the history of the 20
th
 Century then to follow. Without debating the twisted turns 
of political history in Europe since the 1930s (Finland, Norway and Sweden) 
and since 1945 (Austria), social democratic reform ideas in the spirit of 
Polanyi’s “Great Transformation” all gained ground in these countries and 
decidedly influenced the growth of a social welfare state, social partnership 
between wage labor and capital, and a strong state sector, which together 
assured the spectacular growth and ascent in world society right through to the 
early 1980s, and in some countries even beyond. At the same time, and starting 
from the post-World-War I recession, which was as equally deep in Russia as in 
the other countries, Russia’s path towards state socialism initially led to an 
improvement of 45% vis-à-vis the global average until the mid-1960s. Thus the 
net gains in world systemic position as compared to the times before the 
transformation were then about equal in size in both Russia and in the European 
social partnership models, but the models in the framework of a bourgeois 
liberal democracy were far more resilient against the world economic and 
political changes, which set in in the late 1970s. It has to be emphasized as 
well that the temporary relative decline of the world systemic position suffered 
by Finland and Sweden in the late 1980s and early 1990s is also connected with 
the crisis in the USSR/Russia, which was an important market for the export 
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oriented industries in the Scandinavian countries at that time. In the direct 
comparison between the USSR/Russia on the one hand and Austria and Finland 
on the other hand, the results couldn’t be more dramatic. Lenin’s strategy 
brought about a net gain of around 45% in the world system position, to be 
wiped out again almost completely in the final phase of the collapse of 
communism, while the resilience of the social partnership model in Finland and 
Austria brought about an almost uninterrupted net gain of around 50% to 60% in 
per capita purchasing power as compared to the world average.  
 
For Russia, after having suffered so much damage in all the cataclysms of its 
history over the last 100 years, it would be important to remember that the most 
successful postwar political economic strategies (see also Tausch and Prager, 
1992; Schulmeister, 2013) were all defined by  
 
(a) net real wage increases in the rhythm of economic growth 
(b) net interest rates slightly below the rate of economic growth 
(c) a strong mixed economy 
(d) a strong presence of the organized interests of wage labor, capital, and 
agriculture in a democratic decision making processes 
 
Graph 27a: Russia and its development alternatives, 1917. The GDP per 
capita in purchasing power Austria, Finland, Norway, Russia and Sweden 
in relationship to the world average of 31 countries 
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Legend: our own compilations, based on the Maddison data sets, as documented in Bolt and 
van Zanden, 2013. Calculated from the original data with Microsoft EXCEL 2010 
 
 
 
Graph 27b: Austria, Finland, and Russia – similarities and dissimilarities in 
their development trajectory (GDP per capita in purchasing power in 
relationship to the world average of 31 countries) 
 
 
 
 
Legend: our own compilations, based on the Maddison data sets, as documented in Bolt and 
van Zanden, 2013. Calculated from the original data with Microsoft EXCEL 2010 
 
 
In the following, we will also look at the implications of the “Akamatsu cycles” 
for the Arab world and the Muslim world in general. Severe limitations of data, 
however, restrict the scope of our investigation, so that we might only present 
some very preliminary hypotheses. 
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The convergence cycles in the Muslim world – a first 
approximation 
 
 
World systems theory in the traditions of Arrighi and Wallerstein and 
structuralist economics in the tradition of Akamatsu also have important lessons 
to offer for the analysis of the current situation in the Arab countries and the 
Muslim world in general. Although long-term annual data series about GDP per 
capita in real purchasing power are available only for Java/Indonesia and the 
Ottoman Empire/Turkey, we can cautiously draw the following conclusions 
presented in Graph 28a – 28d. Let us start with the optimistic message first: all 
the countries of the region under scrutiny in Graph 28a – 28d currently recover 
from their relatively weak position into which they were sliding in the 1950s and 
1960s and beyond. From the trough of the Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycle in the 
1980s and early 1990s onwards, the following majority Muslim semi-periphery 
countries in the Maddison sample: Albania; Algeria; Egypt; Iran; Jordan; 
Malaysia; Morocco; Tunisia; all somehow managed to recover from their 
Akamatsu cycle troughs they were in some decades ago. Turkey’s ascent with 
some strong upward-directed fluctuations is a special case, showing also the 
strong lift-up in its world system position the country experienced in the heyday 
of the Kemalist reforms in the 1920s, a lift-up which the current government in 
Turkey should not forget. Tunisia, and especially Malaysia experienced a strong 
convergence process over the last four decades. In Malaysia, the effects of the 
Asian crisis (short-term interruptions in an upward path) are clearly visible in 
Graph 28d. Iran and Iraq experienced their peaks in their Akamatsu cycle 
fluctuations during the world oil-price hikes of the 1970s, and experienced a 
strong divergence process afterwards. Syria’s case is an interesting confirmation 
of a Kuznets-cycle length of some 20 year fluctuations also in its convergence 
process.  
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Graph 28a: Iraq, Algeria and Egypt – similarities and dissimilarities in 
their development trajectory (GDP per capita in purchasing power in 
relationship to the world average of 31 countries) 
 
 
 
Legend: our own compilations, based on the Maddison data sets, as documented in Bolt and 
van Zanden, 2013. Calculated from the original data with Microsoft EXCEL 2010 
 
Graph 28b: Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco and Syria – similarities and 
dissimilarities in their development trajectory (GDP per capita in 
purchasing power in relationship to the world average of 31 countries) 
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Legend: our own compilations, based on the Maddison data sets, as documented in Bolt and 
van Zanden, 2013. Calculated from the original data with Microsoft EXCEL 2010 
 
Graph 28c: Iran, Albania, Turkey – similarities and dissimilarities in their 
development trajectory (GDP per capita in purchasing power in 
relationship to the world average of 31 countries) 
 
 
 
 
Legend: our own compilations, based on the Maddison data sets, as documented in Bolt and 
van Zanden, 2013. Calculated from the original data with Microsoft EXCEL 2010 
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Graph 28d: Tunisia and Malaysia – similarities and dissimilarities in their 
development trajectory (GDP per capita in purchasing power in 
relationship to the world average of 31 countries) 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend: our own compilations, based on the Maddison data sets, as documented in Bolt and 
van Zanden, 2013. Calculated from the original data with Microsoft EXCEL 2010 
 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
 
We of course very much appreciate the already existing research results, 
presented in the framework of world-system scholarship and in the framework 
of other theoretical traditions on long cycles of economics and politics. Studies 
confirming or claiming to confirm the basic tenets of the world systems 
approach in the tradition of Kondratieff, 1925, 1926, 1928, 1935; Schumpeter, 
1939; and Wallerstein, 2000, about 40-60 year cycles of economics and even 
longer cycles of global wars were presented, among others, by Bornschier, 1996; 
Devezas, 2006, 2010, 2012; Devezas and Corredine, 2001; Forrester, 1977; 
Goldstein, 1985, 1987, 1988, 1991, 2006; Husson and Louça, 2012; Korotayev 
and Grinin, 2012; Korotayev and Tsirel, 2010; Louçã, 1997; Louçã and 
Reijnders, 1999  Mandel, 1995  Marchetti, 1980, 2006  Metz, 2008  O’Hara, 
1994, 2001, 2005; Perez, 1983; Schumpeter, 1939; Sterman, 1985, 1986; Tausch 
and Ghymers, 2007; Tausch and Jourdon, 2011; and Thompson and Zuk, 1982.  
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The readers of this publication in particular are probably well acquainted with 
the results of these studies. And yet, to be honest, these advances in the direction 
of confirming the long cycle hypotheses nowadays faced up to a formidable and 
technically often very advanced and growing phalanx of various competing 
studies, which question the very existence of longer cycles in international 
economics and politics altogether, or at least restrict the relevance of K-cycles to 
the movements of prices, and not the movements of the “real economy”  thus 
partially or completely falsifying a core concept of the entire world system 
approach (Berry, Kim and Baker, 2001; de Groot and Franses, 2008; Diebolt, 
2012; Diebolt and Doliger, 2006; Diebolt and Escudier, 2002; Garvy, 1943; 
Haustein and Neuwirth, 1982; Kuznets, 1940, 1976; Metz, 2011; Van Ewijk, 
1982).  
 
The parallel world system research hypothesis about cycles of global warfare 
was also fundamentally questioned in research, using advanced time-series 
analysis techniques (Beck 1991; Silverberg G. 2006). And we should recall, as 
has been re-stated recently by Robinson, 2011 that these long cycles are of a 
central and not only peripheral conceptual and theoretical importance for the 
entire paradigm of the world system approach, especially Wallenstein’s 
(Wallerstein, 2000). 
 
Our re-analysis of the entire issue of global cycles and national cycles as well as 
cycles of global convergence and divergence revealed that 
Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycles exist, but that there are other types of cycles as 
well in the global economy, among them two cycles hitherto virtually neglected 
in quantitative research on the subject – the 36 year Barro cycle and the 140 year 
Wallerstein cycle.  
 
For the first time in the literature, we also tried to analyze in a more systematic 
fashion the cycles of convergence and divergence. 
 
So, our results on the level of the world economy are to be interpreted as a 
resounding “yes” for the hypotheses voiced by Kondratiev/Kondratieff, but with 
several additional qualifications and extensions. Kondratiev/Kondratieff was 
right in analyzing a 54 year cycle of the real economy as well, but there are 
other important cycles too; some of them very well known to social science 
research, others perhaps still more to be explored. On the level of industrial 
production growth in the world economy, there is – parallel to the 
Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycle, a 140 year “logistic” cycle, first analyzed by 
Immanuel Wallerstein; and in addition, there is this new 36 year disaster cycle, 
correctly predicted by the neoclassical contemporary economist Robert Barro. 
For sure, there is also evidence – although somewhat weaker than expected – for 
a 22-23 year Kuznets cycle and the shorter, well-known Juglar cycles and 
Kitchin cycles. We achieved our results with the untransformed data at our 
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disposal, but also a 5-year moving average transformation of the original data 
wielded the same results. There is strong reason to believe that the Wallerstein 
cycle is closely connected to the issue of leadership in the international system. 
The period from the end of the Napoleonic Wars to the Great Depression in the 
1930s was the period of the British dominance in the world economy, while the 
US hegemony evolved as a result of World War II and seems to be declining. 
Major world economic depressions have such a Tsunami force that they 
destabilize the entire international system as well. Our results indicate the peaks 
of the international conflagrations in the Thirty Years War, the French wars of 
the 18th Century, the Napoleonic Wars, and the German quest for global 
dominance, 1914-1945 and the evolution of the postwar order with the Korean 
and Vietnam Wars. 
 
Our data clearly support the hypothesis of longer waves of wars in the 
international system. Spectral analysis clearly reveals a 160 year cycle of global 
warfare, which was already evident in the earlier research by Goldstein, 1985, 
1987, 1988, 1991, and 2006 on the subject. The "illusion of cycles"-type of 
literature, initiated by Beck, 1991, thus has to be refuted. 
 
The main results of our analysis of the Maddison data set at the national cycle 
level indicate that Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycles of around 60 years duration are 
most clearly visible in Argentina, Canada, and Russia. We also found evidence 
on the existence of longer cycles of more than 35 years in Belgium; Chile; 
Greece; Netherlands; India; New Zealand; Spain; and USA; while for the other 
countries of the Maddison data set, the spectral density analysis results reported 
in Diebolt and Doliger, 2006 could not be falsified. 
 
A reasonable hypothesis, why there are such differences in cycle length between 
the various countries of the world has to be found: an interesting hypothesis 
could be the application of Bornschier’s dependency theory, centered around 
penetration by transnational capital in the different economies of the world and 
the weakness or strength of “national capital”  Bornschier and Chase-Dunn, 
1985; Tausch, 2010). By and large, the role of transnational capital in the 
countries with longer cycles seems to be historically more pronounced than in 
the countries with shorter cycles, and the strength of the national bourgeoisie 
seems to determine the shortness of cycles. Typical cases, supporting such an 
interpretation would be France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, and 
Switzerland versus Argentina, Canada, Chile, Greece, India, New Zealand, 
Spain and Russia. 
 
In this essay, we also tested the crucial relationship of the Akamatsu cycles of 
convergence and the cross correlation relationship between the Akamatsu cycle 
and the Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycle. In Argentina, Austria, Italy, and 
Venezuela there are either clear linear overall convergences (Austria) or 
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divergences (Argentina), and in Italy and in Venezuela, as well as in Russia, 
convergence had the shape of an inverted “U”. Akamatsu cyclical oscillations 
are shortest in Spain, and longest in Russia. Cross correlation analysis also 
reveals that in Spain; Denmark; Finland; Australia; Greece; Netherlands; 
Argentina there is a clear priority of the cyclical Akamatsu movements over the 
economic growth rates, while in the other countries of the 30 nations with 
available data the Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycle determines the Akamatsu cycle. 
Only further research can clarify whether these differences are to be explained 
by the structure of exports, the role of raw material exports in the economic 
processes etc.  
 
In this work, we also highlight the “convergence slopes” of the countries of the 
world system with available data in terms of their GDP per capita distance, 
parity or superiority with the county which dominated the capitalist world 
system right to the time of the Great Depression, the United Kingdom. We 
highlight the dramatic singularity of Keynesian postwar European 
reconstruction, and we also show that since the 1990s, other mechanisms have 
set in, which clearly are to the detriment of countries of the European Union and 
which currently benefit, among others, some countries of neoliberalism.  
 
Our research also sheds lights on the necessary reformulation of 
Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycle dating schemes and the assessment of the current 
crisis, which began in 2007. There is good reason to believe that the current 
crisis is NOT a Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycle low (which hit the world economy 
in the late 1980s, culminating in the disintegration of Communist rule in Eastern 
Europe and the end of the Soviet Union), but the beginning of a downswing 
phase of the 140 year Wallerstein cycle. We also highlight the big difference 
between the current crisis and the Great Depression starting in 1929: the current 
crisis is far from being the “final crisis of capitalism”. 
 
Another interesting point to be mentioned here is what social science can offer 
to the policy makers at the level of the G-8 and the G-20 and beyond in terms of 
the lessons one can draw about the most successful and the least successful 
strategies to confront the crises in 1929 and 2007. 
 
Our main policy conclusions can be found in the messages, conveyed by Graphs 
22 and 23, and Table 5. Our K-cycle analysis, contained in Graph 22, suggests 
that Portugal, Italy and Spain are the Maddison sample countries most seriously 
affected by the current downturn. The four countries with the most consistent 
and stable convergence path did practice many policy receipts, which are a 
“forbidden medicine” for neoliberal economics – the Scandinavian social 
Keynesian models Norway, Finland, Sweden and Denmark, combining a fair 
amount of social spending, investment in human capital, free trade, and a 
political partnership between wage labor and capital, tending towards wage rises 
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in tandem with the growth of productivity. Their historical progress to stable 
democracy, humanism and well-being in an otherwise unstable Europe is really 
unparalleled. They all started out belonging to the lower half of purchasing 
power per capita among the scale of the countries of the world, and they all 
belong now to the highest 1/3 of the scale.  
 
Being conscious about the limitations of the current paper both in terms of the 
estimates used from the Maddison data set as well as the econometric techniques 
applied, we hope to have shown clearly that some of the foundations of current 
world system research, i.e. the discourse about “long cycles” is not just a 
discourse about a non-existing monster like in Loch Ness in Scotland. Both the 
re-analysis of world industrial production growth data since 1741 as well as the 
global conflict data since 1495 cautiously support the earlier contentions of 
world system research with evidence, tested by spectral analysis and auto-
correlation analysis.  
 
We think that the most important message for future world systems research is 
the realization that convergence processes in most nations of the world are 
discontinuous and of a cyclical nature, thus supporting the pessimism inherent in 
the world system research by Giovanni Arrighi and somehow questioning the 
optimism inherent in the neoclassical convergence analysis, proposed by Robert 
Barro.  
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Appendix (1): Data for world system cycles: 
industrial production, war, defense pacts 
 
 
Applying ACF and spectral analysis to real world data, 1495-2013 
 
 
 
World industrial production growth since 1495 
 
 
Data: 
 
http://www.hichemkaroui.com/?p=2383  
 
for the period after 1998: 
 
http://www.ereport.ru/en/stat.php?razdel=country&count=world&table=ipecia&
time=2 
 
Industrial Production Growth Rate, % (based on US CIA World Factbook) 
 
year value 
1998 0.5 
1999 3.2 
2000 6.8 
2001 0.2 
2002 1.9 
2003 4.1 
2004 5.1 
2005 6.0 
2006 6.0 
2007 5.0 
2008 3.2 
2009 -2.7 
2010 4.6 
2011 4.5 
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Appendix (2): Data for the war cycle 1495 - today 
 
The great question, already raised by Joshua Goldstein, is whether wars 
correspond as well to such a pattern. Allowing for changes in global battle 
technology, which greatly increased military and non-military battle fatalities, 
we performed a transformation of the original data, based on the 10
th
 root of 
annual battle fatalities from major power wars. The 130 to 160 years cycle of 
major power wars seems to be confirmed again, with shorter cycles in between: 
 
 
War cycle since 1495 
 
Data: Goldstein and – after 1945 – PRIO Oslo, see: 
 
http://www.hichemkaroui.com/?p=2383  
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Appendix (3): Replicating Korotayev and Tsirel’ s 
world system analysis of global industrial production 
growth 
 
 
Korotayev and associates recently used a 5-year moving averages 
procedure. On a world level, we get the following graph of world industrial 
production growth (DYN WIPG): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 76 
 
 
 
 
 
Periodogram for the 
entire period 
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Periodogram for 0-80 
years 
 78 
 
 
 
 
 
Spectral density 
graph for the entire 
period 
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Spectral density 
graph for the 
period 0-80 years 
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Autocorrelation analysis, with the 
relevant significant peaks again 
showing the existence of the K-
cycles and the Wallerstein cycles 
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Appendix (4): The Akamatsu cycles compared: 
Country GDP per capita in real purchasing power 
parity as a percentage of the global average for 31 
countries in the world system since 1880 
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Japan 
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New Zealand 
 
 
 
 
 
Norway 
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Peru 
 
 
 
 
 
Portugal 
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Spain 
 
 
 
 
 
Sir Lanka 
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Sweden 
 
 
 
 
 
Switzerland 
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Uruguay 
 
 
 
 
 
United States 
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Venezuela 
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Appendix (5): Rolling regressions – 25 year rolling 
regression slopes. Akamatsu cycle (–cycle of income 
convergence with the capitalist center, USA; left 
hand scale); Kondratiev/Kondratieff cycles: right 
hand scale 
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Appendix (6): Linear time-series convergence 
regression slopes of the countries of the world system 
in terms of the GDP per capita of the United 
Kingdom 
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Appendix (7) The Akamatsu cycle in the entire 
Muslim world since 1950. GDP per capita 
purchasing power in % of the world average of 31 
countries  
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